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When does the Constitution require procedural safeguards for infringements
on First Amendment rights? Surprisingly, this general question has never been
answered.' The absence of procedural protections for First Amendment rights
can yield enormous and substantive implications.2 One particular investigative
tool, the National Security Letter (NSL), is illustrative.3  Each year, the FBI
uses tens of thousands of NSLs to obtain customer "toll billing" information, or
transactional records-such as records related to telephone calls, emails, text
messages, online forums, tweets, or Facebook messages-from service
providers.4 FBI nondisclosure orders, which usually accompany NSLs, prevent
the recipient from speaking about the requests.5 Since 2001, there have been
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1. See Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 671 (1994) (highlighting Supreme Court has never developed
a general test to determine whether First Amendment procedural safeguards apply).
2. See 18 U.S.C. § 2709 (2012) (permitting Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to seek subscriber
records from providers without court order).
3. See In re Nat'l See. Letter, 930 F. Supp. 2d 1064, 1065 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (demonstrating FBI's NSL
use pursuant to statutory authority).
4. See 18 U.S.C. § 2709(a) (2012) (describing service providers' compulsory production of electronic
records to FBI upon request); OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, A REVIEW OF THE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION'S USE OF NATIONAL SECURITY LETTERS: ASSESSMENT OF PROGRESS IN
IMPLEMENTING RECOMMENDATIONS AND EXAMINATION OF USE IN 2007 THROUGH 2009 60 (2014),
https://oig.justice.gov/reports/2014/sl408.pdf [hereinafter NSL REPORT IHI] [https://perma.cc/H2TP-PL38]
(noting NSL requests primarily for telephone and electronic communications); OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN.,
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, A REVIEW OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION'S USE OF NATIONAL SECURITY
LETrERS 36 (2007), https://oig.justice.gov/special/s0703b/fmal.pdf [hereinafter NSL REPORT I] [https://perma.
cc/G7U9-RFL8] (reporting information obtained by NSL from 2003 through 2005).
5. See 18 U.S.C. § 2709(c) (2012) (prohibiting providers from disclosing information related to FBI
request); OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, A REVIEW OF THE FBI's USE OF NATIONAL
SECURITY LETTERS: ASSESSMENT OF CORRECTIVE ACTIONS AND EXAMINATION OF NSL USAGE IN 2006 124
(2008), https://oig.justice.gov/special/s0803b/fmal.pdf [hereinafter NSL REPORT II] [https://perma.cc/4ADZ-
LE4Z] (noting NSL nondisclosure obligations). "Of the 375 NSLs we examined in our random sample, 365, or
ninety-seven percent imposed the nondisclosure and confidentiality obligation established in the Patriot
Reauthorization Act. Based on that result, we projected that of the 15,187 NSLs the FBI issued from March 10,
2006, through December 31, 2006, 14,782 NSLs imposed the nondisclosure and confidentiality obligations."
NSL REPORT II, supra, at 5.
SUFFOLK UN1VERSITYLA WRE VIEW
only a handful of known challenges to NSLs.
6
Although, as a matter of principle, First Amendment jurisprudence accepts
that adequate procedures are essential to protecting civil liberties, those
procedures nevertheless vary greatly depending on context. The Supreme
Court recognizes the essential nature of certain procedures in contexts such as
licensing schemes, prior restraints, and speech regulations, which each apply
different First Amendment analyses and implicate different procedural
outcomes.
7
While the importance of adequate procedures to protect First Amendment
rights is keenly felt in the criminal trial context, First Amendment doctrine
plays a relatively minor role in prescribing procedural safeguards for
investigative activity.8 The Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized the
"danger of tolerating, in the area of First Amendment freedoms, the existence
of a penal statute susceptible of sweeping and improper application."9 Courts
look askance at criminal sanctions for First Amendment activity.10 Yet "[t]he
rules that regulate government investigations have typically emerged from the
Fourth and Fifth Amendments, not the First. Lawyers and judges generally do
not think of the First Amendment as having much relevance to criminal
procedure, let alone as providing its own criminal procedure rules."
11
This Article argues that the near total absence of procedural safeguards for
NSL issuance violates the First Amendment rights of subscribers whose records
the FBI obtains. In Part II, this Article describes the statutory framework
authorizing NSL issuance for communication records. 2  Several examples
illustrate that the NSL process has created a de facto regime in which recipients
automatically comply with requests in the absence of any judicial review.
13
While litigation remains the only avenue for securing judicial review of either
an NSL or an accompanying nondisclosure order, a number of factors make
challenges to NSLs exceedingly rare. The result is that the FBI commonly
obtains communication metadata entirely in secret and without judicial
6. See infra Part n.A.2 (discussing challenges to NSLs).
7. See generally Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218 (2015) (articulating requirements for content-
based speech regulation); Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965) (stating requirements for licensing
scheme); Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697 (1931) (noting requirements for prior restraint).
8. See Daniel J Solove, The First Amendment as Criminal Procedure, 82 N.Y.U. L. REv. 112, 116
(2007) (discussing First Amendment protections in criminal investigations).
9. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963) (explaining First Amendment freedoms as delicate and
vulnerable).
10. See United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2551 (2012) (striking down federal criminal statute
prohibiting false representations about armed forces medals); see also Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 263
(1941) (striking down conviction for publishing comment on pending litigation); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310
U.S. 88, 105 (1940) (striking down picketing conviction on First Amendment grounds).
11. Solove, supra note 8, at 114.
12. See infra Part I.
13. See infra Part H.
[Vol. XLIX:367
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review.14 As a threshold matter, judicial review is a prerequisite to actualizing
meaningful and robust First Amendment safeguards. Whether the First
Amendment protects an NSL target's communications is a constitutional
question for the judicial branch to resolve. In Part III, this Article describes
how NSLs are explicitly directed at uncovering specific subscribers' networks
and associations, even though such subscribers are frequently not the target of
the investigation.15 This type of inquiry also detrimentally impacts the First
Amendment rights of journalists and the press.16
Finally, this Article situates the NSL compelled disclosure regime within the
broader scope of national security law.17 Although nondisclosure orders and
communications surveillance are commonplace within the national security
framework, NSLs present distinctive constitutional problems because of the
conjunction between secrecy, absence of judicial review, and compelled
disclosure of information about communication. While, practically speaking,
secrecy is endemic to other similar surveillance practices, NSLs lack many of
the procedural safeguards used in other national security information-gathering
tools. Additionally, although secrecy undoubtedly is an important feature of
the state's national security surveillance tools, traditional safeguards in other
constitutional contexts-including notice, the opportunity for a hearing, ex ante
judicial oversight, and the exclusionary rule-foster transparency by
facilitating scrutiny of the investigative process. As a result, NSLs are a unique
case study for assessing the adequacy of procedural safeguards for First
Amendment rights in the national security framework.
II. NSLS: THE STATUS QUO
Four statutes authorize NSL use to obtain subscriber information from third
parties such as telephone companies, Intemet service providers, financial
service providers, and credit institutions.18 This Article is primarily concerned
with one of those four statutes: the Electronic Communications Privacy Act
(ECPA).19 A primary purpose of ECPA NSLs, like other forms of metadata
surveillance, is to connect subjects of investigations with their networks in
order to gather information justifying a warrant and court order under the
14. See supra note 5 and accompanying text (noting NSL data request's secret nature).
15. See infra Part Ill.
16. See Katherine J. Strandburg, Freedom of Association in a Networked World: First Amendment
Regulation of Relational Surveillance, 49 B.C. L. REv. 741, 747 (2008) (exploring ways relational surveillance
harms First Amendment).
17. See infra Part V.
18. See generally Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978, 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401-3422 (2012); Fair Credit
and Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1671-1693r (2012); Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. §§
2510-2522 (2012); National Security Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 3001-3234 (2012 & Supp. 2013).
19. Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522 (2012).
2016]
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Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA).20  The information gleaned
through NSLs can "connect terrorism subjects and terrorism groups with each
other," and "can assist in the identification of the investigative subject's family
members, associates, living arrangements, and contacts."
21
ECPA NSLs are issued to communications providers in order to obtain data
22related to communications. Investigative activity that targets communication
presents special First Amendment problems. Like other statutory authorities
regulating surveillance, the ECPA provides that an investigation of a United
States citizen may not be based solely on activity protected by the First
Amendment, such as religious or political activity.
23
A. Statutory Background
As the Office of Legal Counsel recognized, an NSL is essentially an
administrative subpoena requiring production of specified information in
connection with an investigation.24 Administrative subpoenas generally allow
an administrative agency to compel a party to produce documents or testimony
25without judicial approval. As an example, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS)
commonly issues subpoenas, also referred to as summonses, in civil tax
proceedings.26 Additionally, the government frequently uses administrative
27subpoenas in criminal prosecutions. ECPA NSLs permit the FBI to request
the "local and long distance toll billing records" of any person from a "wire or
electronic communication service provider."28  "Toll billing records" are
metadata, not communications content; using NSLs, the FBI may only request
"the name, address, length of service, and local and long distance toll billing
20. See NSL REPORT I, supra note 4, at xxiv (categorizing supporting FISA applications via ECPA NSLs
as "most important" use for such letters).
21. Id.
22. See id. (outlining ECPA NSLs' major FBI investigative fucntion).
23. See 18 U.S.C. § 2709 (2012) (authorizing electronic communication disclosure pertaining to
telephone tolls and transactional records); 50 U.S.C. § 1842(a)(1) (2012) (prohibiting investigation based solely
on First Amendment activity in pen register trap and trace requests); 50 U.S.C. § 1861(a)(1) (2012) (prohibiting
First Amendment activity-based requests for business records).
24. See Memorandum from Office of Legal Counsel to Gen. Counsel of FBI 11 (Nov. 5, 2008) (on file at
http://1.usa.gov/IGZSj0a) [hereinafter Office of Legal Counsel] [http://perma.cc/8DNR-56UW]) (explaining
NSL purpose).
25. See CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32880, ADMINISTRATIVE SUBPOENAS AND
NATIONAL SECURITY LETTERS IN CRIMINAL AND FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE INVESTIGATIONS: BACKGROUND AND
PROPOSED ADJUSTMENTS 2 (2005), https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL32880.pdf [https://perma.cc/33LP-
X52C] (articulating NSL use in administrative subpoenas).
26. See 26 U.S.C. § 7602(a) (2012) (authorizing Secretary of Treasury to summon taxpayer and require
production of books and records). The Secretary of the Treasury has the power to subpoena for purposes of,
inter alia, "ascertaining the correctness of any return." Id.
27. See DOYLE, supra note 25, at 1-2 (generally describing administrative subpoena use in criminal
contexts). The Controlled Substances Act, the Inspector General Act, and 18 U.S.C. § 3486 all provide for
issuing administrative subpoenas for use in criminal prosecutions. See id. at 13-15.




records of a person or entity.
In many ways, NSLs are akin to other forms of administrative subpoenas.
First, NSLs are issued by a member of the Executive branch, such as the
Director of the FBI, Deputy Assistant Director, or Special Agents in Charge at
certain field offices, and are not issued by prosecutors or grand juries.30  Like
other administrative subpoenas, a NSL permits the issuing agency to obtain
records on a showing of relevance to an investigation, which has been
described as a lax standard.31 The core requirement of the NSL statute is that
the FBI must certify in writing that the information sought is "relevant to an
authorized investigation to protect against international terrorism or clandestine
intelligence activities, provided that such an investigation of a United States
person is not conducted solely on the basis of activities protected by the first
amendment to the Constitution of the United States."32 As the Supreme Court
held in analyzing an administrative subpoena issued to a newspaper company
in 1946, an administrative subpoena need not be issued in connection with a
"specific charge or complaint;" rather, "[i]t is enough that the investigation be
for a lawfully authorized purpose, within the power of Congress to
command.,
33
As a corollary, when an agency issues an investigative subpoena, the agency
itself determines whether the investigation is authorized. Courts are fairly
deferential to this determination, finding a subpoena "sufficient if the inquiry is
within the authority of the agency, the demand is not too indefinite and the
information sought is reasonably relevant."34 Likewise, an NSL may only be
used in limited circumstances, but as with other forms of administrative
subpoenas, the FBI itself decides whether those circumstances have been met.
35
Yet NSLs are unique. First, NSLs emerge from an unusual statutory
context. Four out of the five statutes that include NSL provisions are designed
to protect individual privacy and balance privacy interests against the needs of
29. Id; see also Office of Legal Counsel, supra note 24, at 1. "The term 'local and long distance toll
billing records' in § 2709(b)(1) extends to records that could be used to assess a charge for outgoing or
incoming calls, whether or not the records are used for that purpose, and whether they are linked to a particular
account or kept in aggregate form." Office of Legal Counsel, supra note 24, at 1.
30. 18 U.S.C. § 2709(b) (2012) (defining class enabled to issue NSLs).
31. Christopher Slobogin, Subpoenas and Privacy, 54 DEPAUL L. REv. 805, 826 (2005) (suggesting
administrative subpoenas are reviewed under minimal relevance standard).
32. 18 U.S.C. § 2709(b)(1) (2012) (governing scope of relevance inquiry).
33. Okla. Press Publ'g Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 208-09 (1946) (enforcing subpoenas i sued under
Fair Labor Standards Act).
34. United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 652 (1950) (enforcing Federal Trade Commission
orders issued under Federal Trade Commission Act).
35. See OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, U.S DEP'T OF JUSTICE, REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE USE OF
ADMINISTRATIVE SUBPOENA AUTHORITIES BY EXECUTIVE BRANCH AGENCIES AND ENTITIES § II(A)(I) (2002)
https://www.justice.gov/archive/olp/rpttocongress.htm [hereinafter OLP REPORT] [https://perma.cc/4P3K-
LJKF]. "Administrative subpoena authorities allow executive branch agencies to issue a compulsory request
for documents or testimony without prior approval from a grand jury, court, or other judicial entity." Id.
2016]
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law enforcement; in these contexts, NSLs are national security exceptions to
carefully drawn rules.36  In contrast, many of the federal statutes authorizing
administrative subpoenas are closely tied to the conferral of specific
investigative authority within the same statute. For example, the Clean Air Act
contains subpoena uthority related to determinations and investigations of the
various requirements and prohibitions contained in the Act.37  The Inspector
General Act of 1978 is the "single most significant source of administrative
subpoena power," but the authority contained therein is limited to the functions
38of the Inspector General. The Internal Revenue Service is authorized to
"examine any books, papers, records, or other data which may be relevant or
material" to "the purpose of inquiring into any offense connected with the
administration or enforcement of the internal revenue laws."39  The Treasury
Department's broad subpoena authority is located in the Internal Revenue Code
and clearly tied to violations of those provisions.
4
0
Unlike these other administrative subpoena provisions, each NSL provision
exists as an exception to the procedures put in place within its respective
statute. 41 The ECPA, the Fair Credit Reporting Act, and the Right to Financial
Privacy Act are not investigative statutes, but rather impose general bars on
government access to protected records.42 The ECPA was intended to extend
privacy protections to new technologies.4  Indeed, during the initial
congressional hearings on civil liberties and national security that would grow
into the ECPA framework, members of Congress repeatedly raised difficult
questions involving balancing First Amendment rights and the need to protect
military secrets.4 In general, the ECPA embraces the requirement that law
36. See H.R. REP. No. 99-647, at 19 (1986) (characterizing ECPA as balancing interests). "The
Committee believes [ECPA] represents a fair balance between the privacy expectations of citizens and the
legitimate needs of law enforcement." Id.; see also 15 U.S.C. 1681(a)(4) (2012) (advocating for preservation
of consumer privacy); United States v. First Nat'l Bank of Md., 866 F. Supp. 884, 886 (D. Md. 1994)
(describing Right to Financial Privacy Act as balancing privacy and law enforcement concerns).
37. 42 U.S.C. § 7607 (2012) (codifying administrative procedure and availability ofjudicial review under
Clean Air Act).
38. OLP REPORT, supra note 35, § I(A) (summarizing administrative subpoena use by various
government agencies).
39. 26 U.S.C. § 7602 (2012) (explaining authority to summon any person to determine tax return
accuracy).
40. See id.
41. See OLP REPORT, supra note 35, at § IV, tbl. 1 (charting administrative subpoena authorities and
showing many issuing authorities linked to investigative purpose in statutes).
42. See Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978, 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401-3422 (2012); Fair Credit and
Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1671-1693r (2012); Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-
2522 (2012); National Security Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 3001-3234 (2012 & Supp. 2013).
43. See 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (2012) (including electronic devices, storage, and communications in
classification of protected information).
44. See Civil Liberties and the National Security State, 1984. Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts,
Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong. 20-21 (1984),
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/jmd/legacy/2014/06/2I/hear-I03-1983.pdf [https://perma.cc/K6XB-
F9FC] (demonstrating Congressional concerns surrounding appropriate balancing of privacy and security under
[Vol. XLIX:367
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enforcement seek a court order before obtaining customer information. As the
Office of Legal Counsel has observed, "Section 2709 is an exception to the
background rule of privacy established by 18 U.S.C. § 2702(a), which
generally bars a provider from giving the Government a record or other
information pertaining to a subscriber or customer"; the provision, however, is
not a stand-alone grant of new administrative power.45 Additionally, unlike
most administrative subpoena forms, NSLs significantly limit the types of
information that the FBI may seek, barring the FBI from obtaining certain
content. This distinction reflects the ECPA drafters' conviction that the content
of communication records deserves stricter Fourth Amendment safeguards than
mere subscriber records held by a third party.46 In contrast, many other forms
of administrative subpoenas allow the issuing agency to request all relevant
records, regardless of whether they contain content or metadata.47
Finally, the loose standard of NSLs-requiring only relevance to an
authorized investigation-is a relatively recent innovation. Historically, NSLs
required a more stringent relevance showing than did administrative subpoenas
in other contexts. Originally, NSLs were permitted only when the FBI certified
that "there are specific and articulable facts giving reason to believe that the
person or entity to whom the information sought pertains is a foreign power or
an agent of a foreign power.' 48 Although the "reason to believe" standard was
drafted to be less strict than probable cause, the foreign power requirement
often made it impractical and difficult to use the NSL authority in conjunction
with an investigation of a person in the United States.49 In 1993, the "foreign
power" requirement was loosened to allow investigation of an individual who
communicated with a foreign power regarding terrorism or foreign
intelligence.5° In 2001, the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing
Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act
(PATRIOT Act) amended the NSL authority once again, eliminating the
foreign power requirement altogether.51 As a result, it is no longer uncommon
ECPA).
45. Office of Legal Counsel, supra note 24, at 3; see also 18 U.S.C. § 2702(a)(3) (2012) (noting general
confidentiality requirement). "[A] provider of remote computing service or electronic communication service
to the public shall not knowingly divulge a record or other information pertaining to a subscriber to or customer
of such service ... to any governmental entity." 18 U.S.C. § 2702(a)(3) (2012); H.R. REP. No. 103-46, at 2
(1993) (characterizing NSL provision as "limited exception" to rule prohibiting divulgence of customer
records).
46. See H.R. REP. No. 99-647, at 22-23 (1986) (drawing various protective distinctions).
47. See 26 U.S.C. § 7602 (2012) (authorizing Treasury Department to subpoena all "relevant" records in
tax investigations).
48 5. REP. No. 99-541, at 44(1986)
49. See id.; see also Donovan v. Lone Steer, Inc., 464 U.S. 408, 415 (1984) (holding judicial warrant not
"condition precedent" to administrative subpoena).
50. See 18 U.S.C. § 709(b)(2)(B)(ii) (1994) (allowing disclosure of information when specific facts
indicate individual communicated with foreign agent).
51. 18 U.S.C. § 2709 (2012) (omitting mention of foreign power). The PATRIOT Act also broadened
20161
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for NSLs to target United States persons.52  The relevance requirements for
NSLs have loosened over time; however, they remain on par with the relevance
requirements in the average administrative subpoena statute.
53
1. Gag Orders
NSLs are also unique in that the statute authorizes the FBI to issue a gag
order restricting the speech of the recipient without judicial approval or
oversight. Many commentators have recognized that he gag orders presented
by most NSLs are a prior restraint on speech that violate the First Amendment
because they prevent the recipient from speaking.54 The constitutional validity
of this provision and subsequent amendments hereto, have long been the
subject of controversy.55
Originally, the ECPA prohibited any NSL recipient, or "officer, employee,
or agent thereof," from disclosing "to any person" that the FBI had "sought or
obtained access to information or records" under the NSL provision.56 In 2004,
an anonymous NSL recipient in the Southern District of New York challenged
both the NSL provision's substance and the gag order.57  The district court
concluded that the nondisclosure provision was an unconstitutional prior
restraint; the government appealed.58
Subsequently, Congress amended the NSL provision to forbid disclosure to
any person "other than those to whom such disclosure is necessary to comply
with the request or an attorney to obtain legal advice or legal assistance with
respect to the request."59  Congress also provided new procedures for post-
the number of FBI officials empowered to issue NSLs. See OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, A REV[EW OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION'S USE OF EXIGENT LETTERS AND OTHER
INFORMAL REQUESTS FOR TELEPHONE RECORDS 10 (2010), https://oig.justice.gov/special/slO~lr.pdf
[hereinafter EXIGENT LETTERS REPORT] [https://perma.cc/SZJ8-6PF4] (detailing list of FBI officials able to
issue NSLs).
52. NSL REPORT I, supra note 4, at 62 (showing percentages of NSL requests related to investigations of
United States persons).
53. See 26 U.S.C. § 7602(a)(1) (2012) (authorizing inspection of materials "which may be relevant or
material" to tax inquiry).
54. See Patrick P. Garlinger, Note, Privacy, Free Speech, and the Patriot Act: First and Fourth
Amendment Limits on National Security Letters, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1105, 1105 (2009) (analyzing argument
NSLs chill exercise of free speech); Brian D. Eyink, Note, Constitutional Secrecy: Aligning National Security
Letter Nondisclosure Provisions With First Amendment Rights, 58 DUKE L.J. 473, 473 (2008) (arguing NSL
nondisclosure provision restrains protected speech).
55. See Garlinger, supra note 54, at 1107-08 (arguing PATRIOT Act violates Fourth and First
Amendments).
56. 18 U.S.C. § 2709 (2012).
57. See Doe v. Ashcroft, 334 F. Supp. 2d 471, 475 (S.D.N.Y. 2004), vacated by Doe I v. Gonzales, 449
F.3d 415 (2d Cir. 2006).
58. See id. (noting procedural history).




issuance judicial review and challenge of NSLs. 60 The nondisclosure
provision, however, continued to draw attention. In 2006, the Second Circuit
remanded the government's appeal to the district court to consider the revised
statutory framework's First Amendment unanswered questions.6 1 Once again,
the district court held the nondisclosure provision unconstitutional because the
provision, as written:
[G]rants broad discretion to the FBI to completely restrict constitutionally
protected speech on the basis of its content, and it places the burden of
challenging this restriction in court solely on the NSL recipient-a partq that,
in the overwhelming majority of cases, lacks any real incentive to do so.
6
The government appealed.63 On appeal, the Second Circuit construed the
nondisclosure provision, "to place on the Government the burden to persuade a
district court that there is a good reason to believe that disclosure may risk one
of the enumerated harms" and to mean that "a district court, in order to modify
or set aside a nondisclosure order" has to "find that such a good reason
exists."64 Nevertheless, the Second Circuit declined to place the burden on the
government to file a lawsuit enforcing the nondisclosure agreements in the
more than 40,000 NSLs issued in 2005.6 5  Instead, the court construed the
statute to include a "reciprocal notice procedure" by which recipients could
notify the FBI that they wished to contest the nondisclosure order, and in
response, the FBI could initiate judicial review.66 Under the Second Circuit's
formulation, a court may sustain an FBI nondisclosure order only if the FBI had
"good reason" to believe that disclosure of the order "may result" in harm to an
authorized investigation.
67
60. See USA Patriot Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-177, § 115, 120
Stat. 192 (2006) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2709 (2012)) (inserting 18 U.S.C. § 3511); see also 18
U.S.C. § 3511 (2012) (describing subject of subpoena's ability to petition judiciary to set aside nondisclosure).
61. See Doe I v. Gonzales, 449 F.3d 415,419 (2d Cir. 2006).
62. Doe v. Gonzales, 500 F. Supp. 2d 379, 406 (S.D.N.Y. 2007), aff'd in part, rev'd in part by Doe, Inc.
v. Mukasey, 549 F.3d 861 (2d Cir. 2008).
63. See Doe, Inc. v. Mukasey, 549 F.3d 861, 876 (2d Cir. 2008) (noting procedural history).
64. See id. at 875-76.
65. See id. at 879.
66. See id. (justifying statutory construction minimizing government li igation burden).
67. See Mukasey, 549 F.3d at 881. The Second Circuit also held that the standard for judicial review in
18 U.S.C. § 3511 was deferential, but permissible. See id. The NSL recipient in another case, Nicholas
Merrill, eventually reached a settlement with the FBI that permitted him to identify himself as the recipient and
to discuss "most aspects of the NSL." See Merrill v. Lynch, No. 14-CV-9763, 2015 WL 9450650, at *3
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 28, 2015). Nevertheless, the nondisclosure order continued to bar Merrill from disclosing the
categories of records the FBI sought in its 2004 NSL. See id. In 2014 Merrill brought another suit seeking to
disclose further types of information covered by the NSL. See id. The District Court for the Southern District
of New York granted summary judgment to Merrill, finding that the government failed to make an adequate
showing that disclosure of the types of information sought in the 2004 NSL would risk a sufficiently grave
harm. See id.
20161
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In 2013, a district court again considered the constitutionality of the
nondisclosure provision when an NSL recipient brought a First Amendment
challenge to the statute in California.68 The FBI asserted that it was complying
with the Second Circuit's reciprocal notice process nationwide, despite the fact
that Congress never amended the statute to conform to the Second Circuit's
holding.69  The Northern District of California found that "the fact that the
statute is facially deficient.., presents too great a risk of potential
infringement of First Amendment rights to allow the FBI to side-step
constitutional review by relying on its voluntary, nationwide compliance with
the Second Circuit's limitations;" the government appealed the decision to the
Ninth Circuit. 70
While the case was pending in 2014, the Department of Justice (DOJ)
reached an agreement with five U.S. communications providers allowing them
to make additional information available to customers about the aggregate
number of NSLs received.71 Under this agreement, companies may publish
that they have received "0-999" NSLs.72 Then, in June 2015, Congress passed
the Uniting and Strengthening America by Fulfilling Rights and Ensuring
Effective Discipline Over Monitoring Act (USA FREEDOM Act), which
amended Section 3511 to incorporate the reciprocal notice process set out in
Mukasey, and permitted the recipient of an NSL to file a petition for judicial
review of a nondisclosure order.73 Under the amended provision, if an NSL
recipient wishes to challenge an FBI nondisclosure order, it may notify the FBI,
which must then apply for an order prohibiting "disclosure of the existence or
contents" of the relevant NSL.74  The USA FREEDOM Act also directed the
Attorney General to adopt new procedures to require a review of each
nondisclosure to determine if the facts supporting each continue to exist.75 The
procedures, which were adopted on November 24, 2015, provide for the
termination of a nondisclosure obligation upon the closing of the underlying
68. In re Nat'l Sec. Letter, 930 F. Supp. 2d 1064, 1066 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (explaining petitioner's
complaint regarding restricted speech).
69. See id. at 1070 (outlining government's argument asserting NSL constitutionality).
70. Id. at 1067, 1074.
71. See Letter from James M. Cole, Deputy Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, to Gen. Counsels of
Facebook, Google, Linkedln, Microsoft, and Yahoo (Jan. 27, 2014), https://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/
366201412716018407143.pdf [https://perma.cc/KT39-VNY3] (memorializing two ways providers may report
data to the government).
72. See id. Twitter challenged the agreement, arguing not only that it cannot bind companies that have
not agreed, but also that it violates the First Amendment by unconstitutionally restraining companies from
disclosing that they have not received an NSL. See Complaint for Declaratory Judgment at 1, Twitter, Inc. v.
Holder, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 121580 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 11, 2015).
73. 18 U.S.C. § 3511(b) (2012 & Supp. IH 2015). As amended, the provision also makes explicit the
deferential standard of review that courts ought to apply to nondisclosure orders. See id. § 351 1(b)(3).
74. Id. §3511(b)(1)(B).
75. See USA FREEDOM Act, Pub. L. No. 114-23, § 205(f), 129 Stat. 268, 288 (2015) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C; 15 U.S.C.; 12 U.S.C.; 50 U.S.C.).
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investigation unless the FBI finds the statutory standards for a nondisclosure to
be sufficient.76  Under the new procedures, the FBI will also review
nondisclosure obligations after the underlying investigation reaches its third
anniversary. 77
In light of the statutory changes, the Ninth Circuit remanded the case to the
district court for further consideration.78 On remand, the district court rejected
the government's argument that the USA FREEDOM Act's codification of the
Second Circuit's reciprocal notice procedures warranted no additional
safeguards because those procedures were no longer merely "governmental
promises of voluntary, nationwide compliance."79 Instead, the court held that
the Freedman standards should continue to apply to NSL nondisclosure
orders.80 The court concluded, however, that the amended provision for review
of nondisclosure orders complies with the First Amendment.
81
Even after the USA FREEDOM Act amendments and most recent judicial
opinions, lingering questions remain about the constitutionality of the ECPA
NSL provisions. Certainly, leaving aside the question of whether Congress
may constitutionally prescribe a deferential standard of review in First
Amendment cases,82 the amended ECPA NSL statute continues to permit the
FBI to investigate targets' First Amendment activity without any judicial
oversight.
83
2. Infrequent Judicial Review
Although compelling disclosure of membership lists, affiliations, and
identities of speakers has obvious implications for First Amendment rights, the
vast majority of NSL recipients do not challenge these demands for subscriber
information. The result is not only that judicial oversight is severely lacking
within the NSL regime, but also that public understanding regarding NSLs has
76. See TERMINATION PROCEDURES FOR NATIONAL SECURITY LETTER NONDISCLOSURE REQUIREMENT,
FBI 1, 2 (Nov. 24, 2015), https://www.fbi.gov/about-us/nsb/termination-procedures-for-national-security-letter-
nondisclosure-requirement [http://perma.cc/k8sz-jaft].
77. See id.
78. See In re Nat'l Sec. Letter, No. 13-15957 (9th Cir. Aug. 24, 2015), https://www.eff.org/files/2015/08/
28/in re nsl remand order.pdf [http://perma.cc/9fy6-vtxl] (reporting Ninth Circuit's remand rationale).
79. In re Nat'l Sec. Letter, No. 11-cv-02173-SI, at *22 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 29, 2016),
https://www.eff.org/document/redacted-order [https://perma.cc/LSE7-5YGR].
80. See id. at *23.
81. See id at *27. The court, however, also found that as to one of the four certifications in support of
nondisclosure at issue, the government had failed to make an adequate showing to justify maintaining the gag
order. Id. at *2.
82. Doe, Inc. v. Mukasey, 549 F.3d 861, 871 (2d Cir. 2008) (quoting Org. for a Better Austin v. Keefe,
402 U.S. 415, 419 (1971)).
83. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-22 (2012) (describing changes toNSL provisions).
84. See DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ANNUAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT REPORT 3 (Apr. 28,
2016), https://www.justice.gov/nsd/nsd-foia-library/2015fisa/download (explaining FBI made 41,281 NSL
requests for information in 2015, excluding subscriber-only requests).
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been limited. The lack of transparency around NSLs means that there is little
information on how the FBI determines whether an investigation is based
entirely on protected activity, or only partially.85  Because ECPA NSLs so
frequently target speech, this inquiry is especially important, but the FBI's
position remains unclear.
86
Reviewing the available data on the issuance of NSLs makes it immediately
clear that the vast majority of NSLs go uncontested. The FBI issued I 11,144
requests for NSLs during the 2007-2009 period, averaging 37,048 annual
87requests. In 2013, the FBI issued 19,212 NSLs containing 38,832 total
requests.88  The most recent data shows that in 2015, the FBI issued 12,870
NSLs containing over 48,000 requests.89  Historically, the average annual
figure is close to 50,000 requests.90 A majority of the requests relate to
investigations of United States persons.
91
Despite the large numbers of requests, only a handful of challenges by NSL
recipients have come to light. For example, the 2004 Doe v. Ashcroft
92
challenge in the Southern District of New York raised First, Fourth, and Fifth
Amendment claims.93 Soon after, a Connecticut library consortium received an
NSL and challenged it on First Amendment grounds.94 The FBI eventually
withdrew the NSL after a district judge ruled that the gag order accompanying
the NSL was unconstitutional.95 When the Internet Archive received an NSL in
2008 and filed a complaint challenging the request, the FBI withdrew the
85. See Katherine Strandburg, Freedom of Association in a Networked World- First Amendment
Regulation of Relational Surveillance, 49 B.C. L. REv. 741, 783 (2008) (discussing the First Amendment
limitation for investigations in the context of the USA PATRIOT Act). "[W]ithout meaningful judicial
oversight, this provision is essentially toothless and unlikely to deter any law enforcement official bent on
reproducing the excesses of the Hoover era." See id "Would you want to rely on the Government's
determination that you were 'solely' engaged in a protected activity and not in anything else? The statute
plainly suggests that the FBI can investigate United States persons based in part on their exercise of First
Amendment rights, without any safe harbor for such exercise." Michael Traynor, Citizenship in a Time of
Repression, 35 STErSON L. REV. 775, 783 (2006).
86. See id
87. See NSL REPORT III, supra note 4, at 64 (discussing NSL issued by the FBI).
88. See Statistical Transparency Report Regarding Use of National Security Authorities - Annual
Statistics for Calendar Year 2013, OFF. DIRECTOR NAT'L INTELLIGENCE (June 26, 2014), http://bit.ly/TE8H3W
[http://perma.cc/ DHE8-ZRNX].
89. Statistical Transparency Report Regarding Use of National Security Authorities - Annual Statistics
for Calendar Year 2015, OFF. DIRECTOR NAT'L INTELLIGENCE (Apr. 30, 2016), http://l.usa.gov/lTmRuV0
[https://perma.cc/7T8W-5FKL].
90. See NSL REPORT III, supra note 4, at 65.
91. See id. at 62 (providing graphic of NSL request relating to investigation of U.S. citizens).
92. 334 F. Supp. 2d 471 (S.D.N.Y. 2004), vacated by Doe I v. Gonzales, 449 F.3d 415 (2d Cir. 2006).
93. See id at 475.
94. See Doe v. Gonzales, 386 F. Supp. 2d 66, 68-69 (D. Conn. 2005) (citing case with NSL amendment
violations).
95. See Press Release, Am. Civil Liberties Union, Government Drops Demand for Library Records (June
26, 2006), https://www.aclu.org/national-security/govemment-drops-demand-library-records [http://perma.cc/6
5AY-DHEN] (arguing to unseal all documents involved in case).
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NSL.96  In 2013, the FBI withdrew another NSL it sent to Microsoft after
Microsoft challenged the demand.97 Three NSL recipients have challenged the
constitutionality of the NSL statute in the Northern District of California.
98
The sum total of known judicial challenges to NSLs is fewer than ten.
Communications service providers' failures to challenge NSLs reflect a
widespread regime of automatic compliance. Automatic compliance results
from a confluence of factors. First, endemic secrecy prevents users and the
public from scrutinizing individual firms' compliance with government
requests. As Jack Balkin has put it, "Gag rules not only prevent owners of
private infrastructure from tipping off targets of surveillance; they also help
ensure that the public is not aware of the scope and extent of government
surveillance."99 The secrecy surrounding NSLs creates limited incentives for
recipients to challenge a request.
1°°
Elsewhere, Internet Service Providers (ISPs) have argued that disclosure of
user information, such as the text of search queries, would cause serious harm
to relations with their customer base.10 1 Since the public never learns of most
of the disclosures that companies make pursuant to NSLs, it is easy for users to
ignore the risk that information could be disclosed. The risk of losing
customers because of a failure to challenge an NSL is low when the NSL
request itself will likely never come to light. Furthermore, litigating a
constitutional challenge to an NSL can take years. For example, the Northern
District of California only recently issued an order resolving a petition to set
aside an NSL issued in 2011, five years after the petition was filed.
102
Private firms provide the infrastructure for rights of free expression,
association, and the press in modem society; indeed, private firms often raise
individual users' rights as a defense to compliance with govermment demands
for information.10 3  Yet these firms are not well situated to understand
individual users' rights. An ISP has no way of knowing whether toll billing
records or subscriber information requested in a subpoena or NSL is protected
96. See Internet Archives et al v. Mukasey et al, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (Apr. 5, 2016),
https://www.eff.org/cases/archive-v-mukasey [http://perma.cc/TB7Q-5HSE] (reporting on Internet Archives'
NSL case).
97. See In re Nat'l Sec. Letter, No. 2:13-cv-1048 WL 11034005, at *1 (W.D. Wash. May 21, 2014)
(effectuating stipulation to unseal certain documents).
98. See No. 12-1165, In re Nat'l Sec. Letter (Aug. 12, 2013), https://www.eff.org/files/2014/01/ 16/008 -
redacted order enforcingnslsl 165.pdf [http://perma.cc/KR5R-7AFJ].
99. Jack M. Balkin, Old-School/New-School Speech Regulation, 127 HARV. L. REv. 2296, 2332 (2014):
100. See id. at 2333.
101. See Gonzales v. Google, Inc., 234 F.R1D. 674, 683 (N.D. Cal. 2006).
102. See In re Nat'l Sec. Letter, No. 11-cv-02173-SI, at *22 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 29, 2016),
103. See Ellen Nakashima & Julie Tate, Google Says It Fought Gag Orders in WikiLeaks Investigation,
WASH. POST (Jan. 28, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/google-says-it-fought-
gag-orders-in-wikileaks-investigation/2015/01/28/e62bfd4-a5c9-1 Ie4-a06b-9df2002b86a0_story.html
[http://permacc/N7V3-R9VH] (discussing Google's effort to inform users of battle to stand up for user rights).
2016]
SUFFOLK UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW
by the First Amendment.'04 Nor is an ISP in a position to understand whether
an investigation is impermissibly predicated on First Amendment activity,
including whether a suspect is targeted for his or her speech, religion, or
political affiliation. The only person who really has the ability to understand
these issues-and to make the most powerful argument in preservation of his or
her own First Amendment rights-is the target.10 5  For obvious reasons, the
nondisclosure prohibition makes it impossible for recipients to notify targets
that the recipients have received an NSL. Some services have experimented
with so-called canaries as a form of automated notification that a service has
not received an NSL. 106  Nevertheless, this remedy is limited in utility. 1°7  In
March 2016, the online forum "Reddit" removed a canary from its transparency
report that indicated it had not received an NSL or "any other classified request
for user information."108  Because of the way the canary was phrased, it was
impossible to tell whether the removal signaled that Reddit had received an
NSL, a FISA Court order, or some other classified request.10 9 The canary
remedy is also legally questionable; in a discussion on the site, the Reddit CEO
104. See DAVID S. KRIS & J. DOUGLAS WILSON, NATIONAL SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS AND
PROSECUTIONS § 20:10 (updated Aug. 2014). "NSL recipients nearly always will be third-party commercial
entities, and not the subject of the investigation in which the NSL was issued. The recipient therefore will have
little incentive to assert hat the NSL seeks irrelevant information." Id.
105. See id Michael Ratner, Wikileaks' lawyer, made this point after Google notified Wikileaks that it
had challenged requests under ECPA, calling this "an amazing Catch-22." Id.; see also Brett Weinstein, Note,
Legal Responses and Countermeasures to National Security Letters, 47 WASH. U. J.L. & POLY 217, 248
(2015) (explaining NSLs directed to overall ISP while only targeting one user). Due to the nature of the NSL,
the only available challengers are the ISP and the target themselves. See Weinstein, supra, at 248. "However,
the gag order prevents the ISP from communicating to the targeted user that he or she has been targeted,
making the ISP almost always the only entity capable of challenging an NSL." Id. Because large corporations
are usually the "ISP," they often do not challenge the NSL on their user's behalf and fail to implement
practices, like limited data retention, to protect their user's privacy. See id
106. See National Security Demands (2014), MEIUM CORP. (Jan. 5, 2015), https://medium.com/transpare
ncy-report/national-security-requests-fa66dc8f76fc [http://perma.cc/2YMV-8Q72] (discussing warrant canary).
More common is the presence of a canary in a transparency report, which allows a service to show that it has
not received an NSL. See id; Warrant Canary, RSYNC.NET (Jan. 26, 2015), http://www.rsync.net/resources/not
ices/canary.txt [http://perma.cc/7VVS-UPDJ] (making available a weekly "warrant canary"). A canary's utility
is limited because it allows disclosure that an entity has received an NSL, but the gag order would continue to
apply in any specific case. See id
107. See Rebecca Wexler, Note, Warrant Canaries and Disclosure by Design: The Real Threat to
National Security Letter Gag Orders, 124 YALE L.J. F. 158, 171 (2014) (examining First Amendment issues
involved with NSLs and canaries).
108. Dustin Volz, Reddit Deletes Surveillance 'Warrant Canary' in Transparency Report, REUTERS (Mar.
31, 2016), www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-cyber-reddit-idUSKCNOWX2YF [https://perma.cc/XY'V4-KSYW];
see also Transparency Report, REDDIT (Jan. 29, 2015), https://www.reddit.com/wiki/transparency/2014
[http://perma.cc/H22Y-C7DQ] ("As of January 29, 2015, reddit has never received a National Security Letter,
an order under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, or any other classified request for user information.").
If Reddit were to receive an NSL, the canary would disappear, thus alerting users. See Transparency Report,
supra.
109. See Kim Zetter, Reddit Hints-Without Saying Anything-That It Got a National Security Letter,




commented, "Even with the canaries, we're treading a fine line... I've been
advised not to say anything one way or the other."
'1 10
As a result of the ecosystem of secrecy that surrounds NSLs, most NSLs
never face judicial scrutiny, and most targets are never notified that their
records have been requested or obtained. In an unknown quantity of NSL
cases, First Amendment claims are neither pursued nor vindicated, despite the
fact that First Amendment harms are being perpetrated."1 1
III. NSLs AND FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS
NSLs implicate First Amendment rights in a myriad of ways. As a general
matter, there is no question that the collection of toll billing records and
subscriber information using NSLs can seriously chill expressive and
associational activity. As Justice Sotomayor recognized in relation to GPS
surveillance, "[a]wareness that the Government may be watching chills
associational and expressive freedoms."'1 12 In a world where smartphones are
all but actually physically attached to our person, toll-billing records can reveal
friendships and intimate relationships as well as religious beliefs, political
associations, or reporter-source relationships.
11 3
The ECPA NSL provision explicitly requires that investigations upporting
NSL issuance are not based solely on First Amendment activity.1 14 Yet NSLs
are explicitly designed to facilitate investigations on the basis of
communications and associations. NSLs can help investigators answer
questions such as: are the targets members of a religious group? A political
advocacy group? Reporters or journalists? A family?
Two individual strands of First Amendment doctrine--emanating from
associational rights and the Press Clause-tend to show that metadata connects
individuals to each other, and that adequate safeguards are therefore essential to
ensuring that these rights are protected. Under the ECPA, there is no
acknowledgment that communications metadata may be protected from
compelled disclosure by the First Amendment.115 As a result, the NSL
provision's lack of procedural safeguards has led to widespread abuses of the
process.
110. Id.
111. See In re Nat'l Sec. Letter, 930 F. Supp. 2d 1064, 1074 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (explaining nondisclosure
accompanies ninety-seven percent of NSLs); Weinstein, supra note 105, at 260. Weinstein notes, "Because
most ISP recipients see no benefit to challenging NSLs on behalf of customers who will never know an NSL
was issued, challenges are extremely rare." Weinstein, supra note 105, at 260.
112. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 956 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
113. See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2484 (2014); see also Office of Legal Counsel, supra note
24, at 5 (finding any records "suitable for billing" constitute toll-billing records under ECPA NSL statute).
114. See 18 U.S.C. § 2709(b)(2) (2012).
115. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522 (2012).
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A. First Amendment Protections for Group Associations
The First Amendment does not protect all forms of association. For
example, associations within terrorist cells are undoubtedly not protected. A
long line of cases, however, unequivocally find that associational iberties-
including the right to associational privacy-are a core aspect of the First
Amendment.1 16  The link between associational liberties and associational
privacy rights was first articulated in 1958, when an Alabama state court fined
the NAACP $100,000 in contempt charges for failing to disclose its
membership lists to state officials pursuant to a production order.117 The case
arose from efforts to ban the NAACP outright because of its work backing an
"illegal boycott" in opposition to segregated transportation in Montgomery.
118
John Patterson, the Attorney General who argued the case for Alabama, ran for
governor later that year, reputedly with the backing of the Ku Klux Klan, and
won.119 In the racially charged climate of Southern politics, the NAACP's
refusal to disclose the names of its members was understandable. At trial, the
NAACP proved that "on past occasions revelation of the identity of its rank-
and-file members ha[d] exposed these members to economic reprisal, loss of
employment, threat of physical coercion, and other manifestations of public
hostility."'12  The trial court nevertheless held the NAACP in contempt.
121
In its unanimous decision reversing the Alabama Supreme Court's contempt
adjudication, the United States Supreme Court held that the NAACP had
standing to protect its members from "compelled disclosure by the state of their
affiliation with the Association."1 22  Determining that First Amendment
freedoms could not be severed from the guarantee of liberty in the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, Justice Harlan wrote that Alabama had
not shown a compelling governmental interest in requiring the NAACP to
disclose membership lists. 123  Although the disclosure requirement did not
amount to a direct ban on membership in the NAACP, the Court decided that it
116. See Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618 (1984) (recognizing rights of association as protected
by U.S. Constitution). The court has established the right to "associate for the purpose of engaging in those
activities protected by the First Amendment--speech, assembly, petition for the redress of grievances, and the
exercise of religion. The Constitution guarantees freedom of association of this kind as an indispensable means
of preserving other individual liberties." See id.; see also NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958)
(explaining court recognizes rights pertaining to freedom of associations).
117. See NAACP, 357 U.S. at 454 (tracing historical link between associational liberties and privacy
rights).
118. Seeidatl166-67.
119. Crusader Son Wins Alabama Governor Bid, CHI. DAILY TRIB. (June 4, 1958), http://archives.chicagot
ribune.con 1958/06/04/page/10/article/crusader-son-wins-alabama-govemor-bid [https://perma.cc/S98L-KFT3
] (discussing ties to KKK). "Patterson admitted acquaintance with the Klan grand dragon in Alabama. . but
insisted that he did not know Shelton was a K.K.K. leader." See id.
120. NAACP, 357 U.S. at 462 (discussing NAACP's claims).
121. See id. at 449 (addressing NAACP contempt issue).
122. Id.at458.
123. See NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449,460,466 (1958).
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would indirectly constitute an unacceptable "restraint on freedom of
association.124  Calling First Amendment liberties of speech, press, and
association "indispensable," the Court recognized that many government
actions may unintentionally abridge those rights.125 Comparing the disclosure
requirement to "a requirement that adherents of particular religious faiths or
political parties wear identifying arm-bands," Justice Harlan recognized that
compelled disclosure of an organization's membership list, particularly one
with dissident beliefs, would seriously undermine the ability of individuals to
exercise their freedom to associate with those organizations.
126
Two years later, in Bates v. City of Little Rock,127 the Court again
unanimously repudiated compelled disclosure requirements.128 The cities of
Little Rock and North Little Rock had imposed an "occupational license tax"
on commercial enterprises within their city limits.129  Later, both cities
amended these tax ordinances, requiring organizations to disclose the identities
of due-paying, contributing members. 13  The presidents of the NAACP
branches in each city refused to do so, although they largely complied with the
nonidentifying aspects of the disclosure requirements.131 As a result, each was
convicted of a misdemeanor violation of the ordinance.'32 The U.S. Supreme
Court again struck down the requirement on substantive due process grounds,
holding that although the cities had a legitimate interest in taxing commercial
enterprises, they had "[flailed to demonstrate a controlling justification for the
deterrence of free association which compulsory disclosure of the membership
lists would cause."' 33  In a concurring opinion joined by Justice Douglas,
Justice Black wrote that freedom of association is entitled to the same
protections as other First Amendment rights.134 In Justice Black's formulation,
Little Rock not only had not, but also could not possibly come up with a state
interest that would justify impinging on First Amendment liberties. 
135
124. Id. at 462 (comparing compelled disclosure of group affiliation with other government action
blocking rights).
125. See id at 461 (recognizing unintended consequences of government action).
126. Id. at 462, 463 (discussing NAACP's claims).
127. 361 U.S. 516 (1960).
128. See id. at 527 (holding municipalities cannot constitutionally require compulsory disclosure of
organizations membership lists).
129. Id. at 517.
130. Seeid. at517-18.
131. See Bates, 361 U.S. at 519 (discussing organizations refusal to reveal names of organization
members).
132. Seeid.at521.
133. Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 527 (1960).
134. See id. at 528.
135. See id.; see also Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 157-59 (1959) (Black, J., concurring) (discussing
First Amendment implications). The language of the First Amendment does not give way to infringements of
speech or press, no matter how slight. Justice Black did not believe the federal government had the power to
undermine speech or press due simply to what may be thought to be a more important interest. See id.
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In the same year, the Court dismissed a challenge to the imprisonment of the
Director of World Fellowship, Inc. on jurisdictional grounds.136 The Director
was held on civil contempt charges for failing to produce membership lists to a
New Hampshire committee investigating subversive activities.137 Dissenting to
the dismissal, Justice Douglas argued that Bates stood for an individual, as
opposed to an organizational, right not to disclose membership lists, and
argued that the right to free association applied equally to suspected
Communists as it did to the NAACP.
138
Yet this latter point was not always clear. In Scales v. United States,
139
decided the following year, the Court rejected a challenge to the so-called
membership clause of the Smith Act, which made it a crime to be a member of
a group that advocated the violent overthrow of the government.140 Scales, a
member of the Communist Party, argued that the statute unconstitutionally
"impute[d] guilt to an individual merely on the basis of his associations and
sympathies, rather than because of some concrete personal involvement in
criminal activity.' ' 141 Writing for a 5-4 majority, Justice Harlan rejected Scales'
argument, reading into the statute implied requirements that a defendant has
engaged in "active membership" and has "specific intent."'142 Over three
vigorous dissents by Justices Black, Douglas, and Brennan, Justice Harlan
argued that Scales's membership in the Communist Party was not protected by
the First Amendment, holding there was "no reason why membership, when it
constitutes a purposeful form of complicity in a group engaging in this same
forbidden advocacy, should receive any greater degree of protection" than
advocacy for violent overthrow of the government. 1
43
Scales raised important questions about the nexus between association and
advocacy that the Court next addressed in NAACP v. Button.144 In Button,
Justice Brennan struck down a Virginia statute aimed at curtailing the
NAACP's desegregation litigation on the basis that it was inconsistent with the
First Amendment.145 The statute forbade an agent of an organization "which
retains a lawyer in connection with an action to which it is not a party and in
which it has no pecuniary right or liability" from soliciting legal business
within the state.146 Virginia argued that he First Amendment did not protect
136. See Uphaus v. Wyman, 364 U.S. 388, 388 (1960).
137. See id.
138. See id. at 406, 408 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
139. 367 U.S. 203 (1961).
140. See id. at 225.
141. Seeid. at220.
142. Id. at 224 (upholding lower court's recognition of these two implied requirements).
143. Scales, 367 U.S. at 229.
144. 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
145. See id at 444-45.
146. Id. at 423 (holding statute unconstitutional).
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solicitation and litigation.147 Justice Brennan, writing for the Court, rejected
that argument, holding that not only was the statute's distinction between
criminal solicitation and First Amendment-protected activity unconstitutionally
vague, but the First Amendment protected advocacy of litigation itself.
148
The Court's free association jurisprudence, however, generally suggests that
suspected Communists enjoyed less substantive protection than did members of
the NAACP. Thus, in Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation
Committee,149 the Court rejected Florida's efforts to compel the NAACP to
disclose membership information during an investigation of "Communists and
Communist activities."15 Justice Goldberg argued that compelling disclosure
by the NAACP to get information about a third party "presents, under our
cases, a question wholly different from compelling the Communist Party to
disclose its own membership.' 151  Because the state demonstrated no
connection between the NAACP and subversive activity, the Court refused to
recognize a compelling state interest in disclosure of the NAACP membership
lists.152  In his dissent, Justice Harlan found that given the history of
congressional inquiry into "Communist infiltration ... it is indeed strange to
find the strength of state interest in the same type of investigation now
impugned."153 Justice White, also dissenting, protested that "the net effect of
the Court's decision is ... to insulate from effective legislative inquiry and
preventive legislation the time-proven skills of the Communist Party in
subverting and eventually controlling legitimate organizations.' 
54
Three years later, in DeGregory v. New Hampshire,155 the Court overturned
a contempt charge against a suspected Communist who had refused to answer
questions about his earlier participation in subversive activities, finding New
Hampshire's interest too far removed and speculative to get around First
Amendment protections.56  Justice Harlan again dissented, objecting to the
notion that New Hampshire would first have to demonstrate a link to current
Communist activities before commencing its investigation.157
Yet despite some Justices' suspicion that the application of strict scrutiny
review to compelled disclosure of Communist affiliations would hamstring
147. See id. at 429.
148. See Button, 371 U.S. at 437 (noting Chapter 33 as construed limits First Amendment freedoms").
149. 372 U.S. 539 (1963).
150. See id. at 542-43.
151. Seeidat549.
152. See id. at 555. "Without any indication of present subversive infiltration in, or influence on, the
Miami branch of the N.A.A.C.P.... we are asked to find the compelling and subordinating state interest which
must exist if essential freedoms are to be curtailed or inhibited. This we cannot do." Id.
153. See Gibson, 372 U.S. at 580.
154. Id. at 585.
155. 383 U.S. 825 (1966).
156. See id. at 830.
157. See id. (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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efforts to combat the Communist threat, the Court has continued to impose
searching review where associational privacy is at stake. This obviously does
not mean that all associations are entitled to First Amendment protection. In
Roberts v. Jaycees,158 the Court distinguished between associations that are
intimate and those that are expressive to hold that the Jaycees' exclusion of
women was unconstitutional.159 While intimate associations-such as sexual
relationships, marriage, and family-are protected "as a fundamental element
of personal liberty," the First Amendment protects expressive associations "as
an indispensable means of preserving other individual liberties."'1 60 In practice,
it is difficult to draw a line between expressive and non-expressive associations
and some have argued that, partly as a result, expressive associational rights are
given short shrift in comparison to antidiscrimination norms.
161
B. Press Rights
Warrantless acquisition of communications metadata also implicates First
Amendment harms for journalists and the press. Numerous cases emphasize
the importance of procedural safeguards to protect the free press from
overzealous investigative activity, including the unwarranted identification of
confidential sources. Despite the technological novelty of the NSL mechanism,
the strongest articulation of how compelled disclosure can damage the press as
an institution hearkens back to a precedent from Branzburg v. Hayes.
162
In Branzburg, the Court considered whether reporters have the same
obligation "to respond to grand jury subpoenas as other citizens do .... " ,63
Dismissing concerns that refusing to shield reporters from grand jury
subpoenas would result in a widespread chilling effect, the Court wrote,
"[r]eliance by the press on confidential informants does not mean that all such
sources will in fact dry up because of the later possible appearance of the
newsman before a grand jury."
164
In his Branzburg concurrence, however, Justice Powell stressed that if a
source fears that an investigation is baseless, he has potential remedies.,
65
While Justice Powell rejected the reporter's position that he possessed "a
constitutional privilege not even to appear before the grand jury" unless a court
158. 468 U.S. 609, 618 (1984).
159. See id. at 618 (noting two types of associations exist and concluding Jaycees not entitled to
constitutional protection).
160. See id. (distinguishing standards applied to intimate and expressive associations).
161. John D. Inazu, The Unsettling "Well-Settled" Law of Freedom ofAssociation, 43 CoNN. L. REv. 149,
154 (2010) (finding untenable distinction between intimate and expressive association leaves nation with "anti-
discrimination norms unchecked by principles of group autonomy").
162. See 408 U.S. 665, 682 (1972) (noting groundbreaking case in compelled disclosure).
163. See id.
164. See id at 694.
165. See id at 710 (Powell, J., concurring).
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issued an appropriately tailored order, his concurrence noted that available
procedures were adequate to address situations in which the grand jury abused
its subpoena power.166 For example, a reporter who believed that a grand jury
subpoena was unnecessary or overbroad could ask the court to quash it and
enter a protective order on his or her behalf.167 The availability of adequate
protections was key to ensuring that the grand jury subpoena did not become a
tool of "harassment."'
' 68
Six years later, in Zurcher v. Stanford Daily,169 a student newspaper sued for
declaratory and injunctive relief after the police obtained a warrant to search
the newsroom for evidence related to a skirmish between protesters and police
at the Stanford University Hospital.170 The district court granted relief, holding
that "where the innocent object of the search is a newspaper, First Amendment
interests are also involved and that such a search is constitutionally
permissible" only under very limited circumstances.'
71
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the decision, but the Supreme Court reversed,
rejecting the newspaper's contention that additional First Amendment factors
justified a rule forbidding the search warrant and permitting the supposedly less
intrusive means of a subpoena to obtain documents and evidence.'72 Rather,
"[p]roperly administered, the preconditions for a warrant-probable cause,
specificity with respect to the place to be searched and the things to be seized,
and overall reasonableness-should afford sufficient protection against the
harms that are threatened by warrants for searching newspaper offices."'
173
Because unfettered searches and seizures also may silence speech, it is essential
that Fourth Amendment protections possess real teeth.174  The Court
highlighted that requiring a warrant prevents abuse of discretion by the officers
that will use them.175 The Court determined that the relative rarity of warrants
for searching newsrooms actually suggests a lack of abuse, and that any
individual incident of abuse would be easily corrected.1
76
Likewise, another 1978 case regarding the use of subpoenas to obtain toll
records of journalists suggests that practical limitations on communications
surveillance capabilities provided safeguards against overzealous
166. Branzburg, 498 U.S. at 724 (Powell, J., concurring).
167. See id.
168. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 707-08 (1972) (majority opinion) (stating grand jury
investigation should be held to good faith standard).
169. 436 U.S. 547 (1978).
170. See id at 550-51 (reviewing facts on appeal).
171. Seeid at 552.
172. See id at 563, 568 (rejecting newspaper's argument and reversing appellate decision).
173. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. at 565.
174. See id at 564.
175. See id.
176. See id at 566.
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investigation.'77  In Reporters Committee for Freedom of Press v. American
Telephone & Telegraph Co.,178 (RCFP), a group of journalists demanded
assurances from AT&T that their toll billing records would not be handed over
to a governmental investigation without first consulting those affected.
179
AT&T refused, and the government intervened.'80 In a split panel decision, the
D.C. Circuit rejected the journalists' assertion of a First Amendment privilege,
thereby protecting them from subpoenas without notice. 81
The opinion relied heavily on the fact that subpoenas for toll billing records
were of limited utility.' 82  Judge Wilkey wrote that, based on personal
experience, "prosecutors in this Office are extremely cautious in subpoenaing
toll records.'83 Moreover, the toll records available were less revelatory than
today. The records only contained long distance calls by individual subscriber
numbers, and therefore could not be used to see a record of a call placed or
received by that subscriber, but that was charged to the other number.184 The
court also found that toll records were not available for extensions from
business phones or pay phones.'85  Finally, the court noted that the records
were only kept for sixth months, and were no longer available after that time.'
86
None of these safeguards are present in the NSL context. Indeed, RCFP
specifically acknowledged that "the propriety of any such practice" of large-
scale subpoenas, "if it does exist, is simply not raised in the case at bar."
187
Thirteen months after Stanford Daily was decided, the Court issued its ruling
in Smith v. Maryland,188 putting in place the "third party doctrine" that permits
the government to obtain records from a third party without a warrant.
189
Stewart dissented again, unpersuaded that the Constitution did not protect
information that "easily could reveal the identities of the persons and the places
called, and thus reveal the most intimate details of a person's life."1 90 This
177. See Reporters Comm. for Freedom of Press v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 593 F.2d 1030, 1070-71 (D.C.
Cir. 1978).
178. 593 F.2d 1030 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
179. See id. at 1038.
180. See id.
181. See id. at 1070-71 (holding plaintiffs not entitled to First Amendment protection under ither theory).
182. See Reporters Comm. for Freedom of Press, 593 F.2d at 1036 (listing shortcomings of subpoenas for
toll records).
183. Id. at 1037 n.7.
184. See Reporters Comm. for Freedom of Press, 593 F.2d at 1036 (describing accessible toll
information).
185. See id. at 1037 (detailing further scope of accessible toll information).
186. See id.
187. See id at 1040. The portion of RCFP that concludes, "the First Amendment offers no procedural or
substantive protections against good faith criminal investigative activity beyond that afforded by the Fourth and
Fifth Amendments," did not have a majority of the panel. See id at 1053 n.76, 1055.
188. 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
189. See id. at 744-45 (analyzing Fourth Amendment warrant requirement in context of records held by
third parties).
190. Id. at 748 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (inferring people have reasonable expectation of privacy in
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time, though, it was Justice Marshall who, in dissent, looked to potential
infringements of the First and Fourth Amendments by this unregulated
surveillance.191 "Permitting governmental access to telephone records on less
than probable cause may thus impede certain forms of political affiliation and
journalistic endeavor that are the hallmark of a truly free society."'
' 92
C. The FBI's First Amendment Problem
Public reports by the Office of the Inspector General for the Department of
Justice (OIG) detail problems with the ECPA NSL statute that are emblematic
of the First Amendment concerns. In a 2010 report, the OIG detailed problems
with the FBI's practice of gathering "community of interest" or "calling circle"
data from NSL recipients.'93  The OIG noted that calling circle requests
appeared in hundreds of boilerplate attachments to NSLs and that the officials
who signed these requests were sometimes unaware that they contained
requests for calling circle information.1 94 The OIG concluded that community
of interest requests were improper because the FBI did not "consistently
assess" all the telephone numbers listed and their relevance to the underlying
investigation.1 95  While the OIG made no mention of the First Amendment
concerns associated with the wholesale collection of telephone records not
linked to any investigation, it nonetheless concluded, "[t]he FBI's community
of interest ... practices were inappropriate and likely resulted in the FBI
obtaining and uploading into a... database thousands of telephone records
for.., telephone numbers without the required certifications of relevance to an
authorized international terrorism investigation by an authorized FBI
official."
' 19 6
OIG has also identified more specific instances of abuse related to
associational rights. In one instance, the FBI requested records from North
Carolina State University (NCSU) about a former student at the university that
included that student's emergency contact information, campus affiliations, like
clubs or organizations, and information on other students contained in such
records, all in violation of the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act
(FERPA).197 NCSU refused to comply with the NSL and stated that he FBI
numbers dialed).
191. See id. at 751 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
192. Smith, 442 U.S. at 751.
193. EXIGENT LETrERS REPORT, supra note 51, at 54. Community of interest or calling circle data
consists of an analysis of who calls whom, when, how many times they call, how long those calls last, and
various other data. See Christopher Soghoian, An End to Privacy Theater: Exposing and Discouraging
Corporate Disclosure of User Data to the Government, 12 MINN. J.L. Sci. & TECH. 191, 201 (2011).
194. See EXIGENT LETTERS REPORT, supra note 51, at 56-57 (describing requests for "community of
interest" data).
195. Seeid. at75.
196. Id. at 78.
197. See NSL REPORT I, supra note 4, at 83-84 (describing information sought in violation of FERPA).
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overstepped its authority.198 Separately, the OIG identified repeated instances
in which on-site analysts from communications service providers retrieved toll
billing records for journalists and reporters in connection with leak
investigations, despite lacking legal authority to do so.199 In one instance, the
FBI received over twenty-two months of toll billing records for reporters with
the Washington Post and The New York Times. 20 In another case, the FBI used
an NSL to seek over ten years of financial records for an investigation based on
the target's extracurricular college activities.20' When activity the First
Amendment presumably protects is at the core of government requests, even if
not the sole basis, it raises concerns that he FBI continues to use NSLs to seek
information related to an individual's political, religious, or expressive activity.
Recently, the OIG raised questions about the FBI's practice of requesting
toll billing records associated with an investigative subject, even if the records
are not relevant to an authorized investigation.20 2 The OIG found that
telephone companies sometimes provide toll billing records and subscriber
information for all telephone numbers on a given account, such as a family
plan.203 In one specific case, the FBI received toll billing records for all the
phone numbers associated with the target's mother's account.204  The OIG
concluded that the FBI should monitor this type of overarching request, and not
obtain such an overbroad amount of records without the specific association of
said records to a valid investigation for national security purposes.
205
The FBI also takes the position that special statutory and regulatory
requirements that limit the use of subpoenas and warrants to obtain information
from the news media do not apply to NSLs. DOJ regulations on obtaining
information from or records of members of the news media require the DOJ to
pursue negotiations and notice "unless the Attorney General determines that,
for compelling reasons, such negotiations or notice would pose a clear and
substantial threat to the integrity of the investigation, risk grave harm to
national security, or present an imminent risk of death or serious bodily
harm. '206  Although the negotiation and notice requirements apply to
administrative subpoenas and to other orders and warrants issued under the
ECPA, the DOJ Guidelines appear not to constrain the FBI's use of NSLs to
198. See id. at 84 (reporting school's assertion that FBI demanded information beyond permissible scope
of law).
199. See EXIGENT LETTERS REPORT, supra note 51, at 95-96 (explaining retrieved records only partially
fell into period of interest).
200. See id. (noting Company A provided FBI with billing records for 1,627 telephone calls).
201. See NSL REPORT III, supra note 4, at 126 (disclosing potential NSL violations).
202. See id. at 157 (reviewing potential NSL violations).
203. See NSL REPORT III, supra note 4, at 158 (noting problems involved in issuance of NSLs).
204. See id. at 157 (offering examples of problems in specific cases).
205. See id. at 160 (recommending further steps to ensure third-party privacy).
206. 28 C.F.R. § 50.10(a)(3) (2016) (emphasis added).
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obtain communication records belonging to the media.
20 7
Even when the FBI has been notified that an investigation implicates First
Amendment rights, the agency has sometimes ignored this fact. In 2006, the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) twice denied the FBI's
application for a FISA order compelling the disclosure of business records on
the basis that the request infringed on the target's First Amendment
protections.20 8 The FBI did not review the underlying investigation to make
sure it was not being conducted solely on the basis of First Amendment-
protected activity.209 Instead, after the FBI's application was denied, the FBI
used the same factual predicate to issue NSLs for financial information in the
same investigation.
The FBI's position that the underlying investigation was legitimate, despite
the apparent First Amendment issues, rests on the troubling assertion that the
FISA Court has no power to end an FBI investigation.El1 The FBI General
Counsel asserted that the FISC ruling that the investigation implicated the First
Amendment did not require the agency to revisit the predicate for the
investigation.2 11 Yet the prohibition against investigations based solely upon
First Amendment activity in § 215 is identical to the prohibition in § 2709.212
The logic that an investigation may be impermissibly based on First
Amendment activity for the purposes of obtaining metadata under FISA, but
not for purposes of obtaining metadata under ECPA, is tortuous at best.
The unique features of online communication render ECPA NSLs
particularly vulnerable to abuse.213  As Judge Marrero observed, the
compulsion to turn over records from electronic communications is ill-defined,
but one can reasonably interpret it to include a record of email addresses both
214used and emailed, as well as a website browsing history. Indeed, a
troublesome but little-noted ECPA feature is that the statute is written to apply
to phone records, so the scope of records collection from electronic
215
communication service providers is far from clear. Most recently, the FBI
207. See Trevor Timm, When Can the FBI Use National Security Letters To Spy on Journalists? That's
Classified., COLUM. JOURNALISM REV. (Jan. 11, 2016), www.cjr.org/criticism/national securityletters.php
[http://perma.ccNK8X-A4E8] (criticizing absence of NSL guidelines governing requests for journalists' toll
billing records).
208. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., A REVIEW OF THE FBI's USE OF SECTION 215
ORDERS FOR BUSINESS RECORDS IN 2006 73 (March 2008), https://oig.justice.gov/specialls08O3a/final.pdf
[https://perma.cc/B47P-ATAQ] [hereinafter 215 REPORT].
209. See id. at 72.
210. See id.
211. See id. at 72-73.
212. Compare 50 U.S.C. § 1861 (2012) (amended 2015), with 18 U.S.C. § 2709(b)(l)-(2) (2012)
(amended 2015) (noting investigations of U.S. person not to be conducted "solely on the basis of activities
protected by the First Amendment").
213. See Doe v. Ashcroft, 334 F. Supp. 2d 471, 509 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
214. See id
215. See Ellen Nakashima, White House Proposal Would Ease FBI Access to Records of Internet Activity,
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received some form of information that the OIG recognized to be the substance
of electronic communications.216  In this case, one email service provider
routinely responded to NSL requests with a specific type of information that
217was outside the scope of the statute.
In 2008, the Office of Legal Counsel offered guidance for the types of
information in § 2709(b)(1) by creating an exhaustive list of information that
the FBI may request using an NSL, including the subscriber's "name, address,
length of service, and local and long distance toll billing records.2 18 Oddly,
although the "toll billing records" language in the ECPA NSL provision has
been in the statute since 1986, confusion continues to plague NSL recipients
regarding what exactly toll billing records are.219 The OIG repeatedly notes
that NSL recipients disclose information that the FBI is either not authorized to
collect or which the statute does not clearly address.220 In a heavily redacted
portion of its most recent report, the OIG questions whether the statute, in fact,
authorizes the information the FBI receives in response to NSLs for telephone
subscriber records.221
Even in instances where the FBI complies with the statute, it is clear NSLs
can be used to figure out associations that the First Amendment may or may not
protect. For example, NSL Report I documents the use of telephone billing
records to identify "a group of individuals residing in the same vicinity as the
subject" in order "to determine if there was a terrorist cell operating in the
1222city." The Report notes, "[a]nalysis of subscriber information obtained from
national security letters for particular telephone numbers and e-mail addresses
also can assist in the identification of the investigative subject's family
members, associates, living arrangements, and contacts."223  The Report is
silent on the First Amendment implications of investigating a person's
associations in this manner.
IV. RIGHTS WITHOUT SAFEGUARDS
The associational and expressive harms NSLs cause illustrate the need for
adequate safeguards to protect First Amendment rights. Some suggest bulk
WASH. POST (July 29, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/07/28/AR20100728
06141.html [http://perma.cc/U44M-KE35] (discussing lack of clarity surrounding electronic communications
transactional records).
216. See NSL REPORT 1H, supra note 4, at 131.
217. See id. at 132 (discussing unrequested disclosure).
218. Office of Legal Counsel, supra note 24, at I (describing types of information sought in NSL orders).
219. See id.
220. See id (analyzing issues related to overproduction and confusion of NSL requirements and
disclosures).
221. See NSL REPORT IH, supra note 4, at 147-52.
222. NSL REPORT I, supra note 4, at 49 (identifying instance in which FBI located individuals from
records).
223. Id. at 48 (noting other uses of information obtained from NSL).
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surveillance programs could be challenged on First Amendment overbreadth
grounds, or injunctive relief could be an adequate remedy for First Amendment
224harms. These post hoc remedies, however, may not adequately protect
against the chilling effects that widespread investigative activity causes.
225
There are currently First Amendment safeguards present in other national
security processes that, if applied in the NSL context, could protect citizens
before violations take place. Constitutional and statutory requirements
including notice, judicial oversight, and rigorous standards of relevance afford
First Amendment rights an appropriate level of protection.226  These hard
mechanisms reflect strong preferences for courts to resolve First Amendment
227questions, rather than the Executive branch. Nevertheless, soft protections
within the Executive branch, such as non-binding regulations and chain of
command approval for national security processes, should not be discounted,
and can also help protect associational, expressive, religious, and press
rights.228
The total absence, in practice, of the types of procedural safeguards present
in analogous contexts sets NSLs apart. NSLs thus illustrate both the necessity
of appropriate safeguards for First Amendment rights and the risks of national
security process without adequate procedures.
A. Hard Safeguards
In the investigative context, hard safeguards are formally binding
requirements that tend to limit the government's authority to conduct
229investigations. As Dan Solove makes clear in his seminal article on the First
Amendment as criminal procedure, the First Amendment is seldom invoked as
a procedural safeguard in criminal investigations. 23  Nonetheless,
constitutional protections against overly intrusive investigative activity have
First Amendment roots. Other scholars also recognize that First Amendment
interests can trigger heightened safeguards under other constitutional
231amendments. In the context of search and seizure, for example, Akhil Amar
224. See Solove, supra note 8, at 165 (describing First Amendment implications of bulk surveillance).
225. See id.
226. See infra note 304 and accompanying text.
227. See infra note 261 and accompanying text (discussing judicial decisionmaking).
228. See infra note 345 and accompanying text (illustrating one example of soft procedural safeguards);
see also Jacob E. Gersen & Eric A. Posner, Soft Law: Lessons from Congressional Practice, 61 STAN. L. REV.
573, 579 (2008). Gersen and Posner define "soft law" as "a rule issued by a lawmaking authority that does not
comply with constitutional and other formalities or understandings that are necessary for the rule to be legally
binding." Id.
229. See Gersen & Posner, supra note 228, at 579. Gersen and Posner define "hard law" as "a rule issued
by a lawmaking authority that does comply with constitutional and other formalities or understandings that are
necessary for the rule to be legally binding." Id.
230. See Solove, supra note 8, at 116.




First Amendment concerns could well trigger special Fourth Amendment
safeguards-heightened standards of justification prior to searching, immediate
(pre-search) appealability of any proposed search (with the premises sealed to
prevent interim destruction of evidence), specially trained nonpartisan marshals
or magistrates or masters to carry out the search, and so on.232
Indeed, First Amendment doctrine repeatedly emphasizes the importance of
233proper procedures to safeguard protected speech . Prior restraint doctrine, for
example, requires such protections to minimize the risk of censorship.234 When
a Fourth Amendment search implicates the First Amendment, the requirement
of specificity in what things are to be seized is accorded the most "scrupulous
exactitude.'" 235 In First Amendment cases, appellate courts have an obligation
to conduct a de novo review in order to ensure that the lower court did not
impermissibly infringe upon free expression.
236
All of these safeguards rely on one baseline assumption: the courts-not the
Executive branch--determine whether protection should extend to the
association in question. Indeed, the underlying norm that courts will resolve
First Amendment problems is so strong that none of the above cases even
considered a structure in which the courts were not involved in discerning and
applying the correct standard of review.237 This underlying norm is strong for
good reason: Had the question of the NAACP's First Amendment rights been
left to the Alabama government to resolve, the outcome would be
predetermined.
1. The Fourth Amendment
The Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement, which imposes explicit,
.'constitutionally based limitations on police capabilities, is a classic hard
safeguard against overzealous law enforcement activity. A neutral magistrate
assesses whether law enforcement has satisfied constitutional requirements of
(discussing heightened constitutional safeguards when First Amendment concerns are at play).
232. See id.
233. See Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 669 (1994) ("[I]t is important to ensure not only that the
substantive First Amendment standards are sound, but also that they are applied through reliable procedures.").
234. See Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 58 (1965) (holding procedural safeguards necessary where
process requires film submitted to censor).
235. See Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 196 (1927).
236. See Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 499 (1984) (quoting New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 284-86 (1964)).
237. See generally Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661 (1994); Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965);
Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476 (1965); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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probable cause, specificity, and reasonableness.238  The Fourth Amendment,
however, does not apply to the collection of metadata. Therefore, none of the
warrant requirement's safeguards apply to NSLs.239
A Fourth Amendment search takes place, implicating constitutional
protections, only when government activities intrude on a person's reasonable
expectation of privacy. 24  As a rule (albeit a contested one), "what a person
knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a
subject of Fourth Amendment protection.,241 Courts have applied this rule to
hold that acquiring business records from an ISP reflecting subscriber activity
is not a search under the Fourth Amendment.242 As a result, because much
First Amendment activity occurs through online intermediaries like ISPs, email
service providers, social media platforms, mapping programs, and myriad other
mechanisms not controlled by the user or speaker, Fourth Amendment
coverage for records reflecting this type of activity is virtually nonexistent.
243
The lack of Fourth Amendment coverage for NSLs has particularly harmful
implications for the press because it renders inapplicable certain statutory
protections. In the wake of Stanford Daily, Congress passed the Privacy
Protection Act of 1980 (PPA). The PPA bars law enforcement from searching
or seizing work product and documentary materials "possessed by a person
reasonably believed to have a purpose to disseminate to the public a newspaper,
book, broadcast, or other similar form of public communication."244 Because
the PPA's protections are coextensive with the Fourth Amendment's coverage
of searches and seizures, the statute does not apply to investigative methods,
like the acquisition of business records or communications metadata, which are
not searches.245
Statutes also create hard safeguards in the form of standards of relevance
upon which process may be issued. The standard in the NSL statute--"relevant
to an authorized investigation"-is not unique.24 6 Indeed, the FBI can acquire
many of the same types of records on the same showing of relevance using §
238. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
239. See, e.g., Elizabeth Atkins, Spying on Americans: At What Point Does the NSA's Collection and
Searching of Metadata Violate the Fourth Amendment?, 10 WASH. J. L. TECH. & ARTS 51, 77 (2014)
(highlighting Fourth Amendment protections for metadata); Laura K. Donohoe, Bulk Metadata Collection:
Statutory and Constitutional Considerations, 37 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 757, 765 (2014) (discussing Fourth
Amendment implications); David S. Kris, On the Bulk Collection of Tangible Things, 7 J. NAT'L SECURITY L.
& POL'Y 209, 279-80 (2014) (discussing governmental collection of metadata).
240. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
241. Id. at 351 (majority opinion).
242. See Guest v. Leis, 255 F.3d 325, 336 (6th Cir. 2001) (holding no Fourth Amendment privacy interest
where information given to third party).
243. See Solove, supra note 8, at 126-27. Modem technology places information once confined to private
places out into the social sphere, no longer covered by Fourth Amendment protections. See id.
244, 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa (2012).
245. See id. (isolating law's impact).
246. 18 U.S.C. § 2709(b).
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215 orders, pen registers, or grand jury subpoenas.247 In contrast, when the
government seeks electronic communications transactional records through the
Stored Communications Act (SCA), it may obtain subscriber records using
either an administrative subpoena or a court order based on "specific and
articulable facts" showing that the records are relevant to a criminal
investigation.
248
The fact that communications metadata may commonly be obtained on a
showing of mere relevance, however, does not end the inquiry. When the
government seeks a § 215 order, pen register, or grand jury subpoena for toll
records, other safeguards-both ard and soft-are in place that mitigate the
effect of the relaxed standard of relevance. For example, § 215 orders and pen
registers require a court order.249 In addition, grand jury subpoenas require the
involvement and oversight of a United States Attorney.250  The presence of
multiple, overlapping safeguards is a key feature for preventing abuse of law
enforcement process.
2. Judicial Decision-Making
ECPA's NSL provision is also troubling because it invites the FBI to decide
a key, substantive First Amendment issue: whether to impose a nondisclosure
order on NSL recipients. The tradition of judicial decision-making on First
Amendment questions demonstrates that this constitutional issue is
fundamentally inappropriate for the Executive branch to resolve.
Nondisclosure orders themselves are nothing unique. For example, a
government entity seeking customer records using a warrant or subpoena,
under the SCA, may apply for an order barring the recipient from disclosing the
existence of the request.251 Likewise, an order authorizing a pen register or trap
and trace device is required to include a nondisclosure order provision sealing
the order and preventing the person who provides the monitored service from
252disclosing the existence of the pen or trap. The FISA contains a provision
that bars the recipient of an order, in a foreign intelligence investigation, from
disclosing such an order.253 Nor are administrative subpoenas rare birds. A
2001 DOJ report identified hundreds of sources of administrative subpoena
247. See USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 215, 115 Stat. 272, 287-88 (codified at 50 U.S.C. §§
1861-1863 (2012)).
248. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2703(d), 2703(b)(8)(i), 2703(a) (2012) (describing requirements for court order under
SCA).
249. See 50 U.S.C. § 1861 (2012) (setting out requirements for FISA Court order for production of
tangible things); 18 U.S.C. § 3123 (2012) (setting out requirements for pen register or trap and trace order).
250. See FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, DOMESTIC INVESTIGATIONS AND OPERATIONS GUIDE § 18.5.9.3
(2011) (explaining U.S. Attorney issues grand jury subpoena).
251. See 18 U.S.C. § 2705(b) (2012).
252. See 18 U.S.C. § 3123(d) (2012).
253. See 50 U.S.C. § 1861(d) (2012).
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authority.254  In federal criminal child abuse and healthcare fraud
investigations, the district court may render an order, ex parte, which requires
that anyone associated with the event not disclose the summons to anyone,
except an attorney, for up to 90 days.
255
The confluence of administrative subpoena authority and administrative gag
authority is found only in the NSL context. When the government obtains
customer records using an administrative subpoena under the SCA, a federal
court issues the nondisclosure order, not the government by itself.256 When the
government seeks a nondisclosure order under the SCA, the government is not
empowered to determine itself whether it also met the requisite standard
justifying nondisclosure; that inquiry resides with the court.257 By contrast, the
NSL provision only permits a court to conduct such an inquiry under the
limited circumstances in which a recipient has filed a petition for review.
258
Even in the context of FISA applications, in which the FISC enters an ex parte
order approving an application with a nondisclosure order as a matter of law,
judicial order compels nondisclosure, not executive fiat.
259
First Amendment jurisprudence has long recognized that whether something
falls under First Amendment "speech" is a question best resolved by a court.260
For example, in 1981, Professor Schauer remarked that "obscenity doctrine is
undoubtedly the most prominent example" of judicial delineations of
expressions outside constitutional speech protections. 26  Obscenity doctrine
remains instructive regarding the capacity of the Executive branch to make
unilateral determinations regarding whether the First Amendment covers or
262protects obscene materials.
In 1957, the Supreme Court held that the First Amendment does not protect
obscenity.263 The Court recognized, however, that the court must protect First
254. See OLP REPORT, supra note 35, at 2.
255. See 18 U.S.C. § 3486(a)(6)(A) (2012).
256. See 18 U.S.C. § 2705(b) (2012); see also In re Application of U.S. for an Order of Nondisclosure
Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2705(B) for Grand Jury Subpoena # GJ2014031422765, 41 F. Supp. 3d 1, 8 (D.D.C.
2014) (finding nondisclosure order warranted where government made statutory showing and court believed
harm would result).
257. See 18 U.S.C. § 2705(b) (requiring court considering request for nondisclosure order "shall enter
such an order if it determines that there is reason to believe that notification" of existence of SCA order would
result in an enumerated harm).
258. In re Nat'l Sec. Letter, No. 11-cv-02173-SI, at *14 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 29, 2016),
https://www.eff.org/document/redacted-order [https://perma.cc/92VL-G4FU].
259. Cf In re Nat'l Sec. Letter, 930 F. Supp. 2d 1064, 1073 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (finding nondisclosure
provision of § 2709 is licensing scheme lacking appropriate safeguards).
260. See Frederick Schauer, Categories and the First Amendment: A Play in Three Acts, 34 VAND. L.
REV. 265, 268 (1981).
261. Id
262. See Henry P. Monaghan, First Amendment "Due Process, " 83 HARV. L. REv. 518, 520 (1970)
(discussing reasons why due process ideals require judicial characterization of speech).




Amendment freedom by only prosecuting speech that is actually obscene.264 In
Roth v. United States, the Court found that the trial courts had applied the
correct standard for First Amendment coverage. 265 Separately, Justice Harlan
took issue with "easy labeling and jury verdicts as a substitute for facing up to
266the tough individual problems of constitutional judgment" required. Justice
Harlan argued that whether the First Amendment protects a given expression is
not just a factual determination, but a constitutional one best left to a court.267
While Justice Harlan did not comment on later obscenity decisions, these
decisions do strongly suggest hat whether the First Amendment covers an
expression is essentially a judicial question. In Kingsley Books, Inc. v.
Brown,268 the Court upheld a New York statute permitting a limited injunction
preventing the distribution of materials after they were deemed obscene at
trial. 26 9 In contrast, in Marcus v. Search Warrants,27° the Court struck down a
Missouri statute permitting police to obtain a warrant to seize materials:
(1)'[w]ithout notice or any hearing afforded to the movants prior to seizure for
the purpose of determining whether or not these... publications are obscene,'
and (2) because they 'allowed police officers and deputy sheriffs to decide and
make a judicial determination after the warrant was issued as to which...
magazines were ... obscene.
271
The Marcus Court contrasted the Missouri statute at issue to the New York
law it upheld four years before.272  The Court noted the New York law had
procedural protections not present in the Missouri statute, requiring a court to
render a decision, on the merits, regarding whether speech was protected.273
In Manual Enterprises v. Day,274 the Court overtumed a Post Office ruling
that prevented publishers from mailing publications with allegedly obscene
264. See id. at 488 (advocating for careful review to safeguard speech).
265. See id at 490 (concluding trial court applied correct obscenity standard).
266. Id. at 498 (Harlan, J., concurring and dissenting) (discussing fear for future cases based on cavalier
labeling).
267. See Roth, 354 U.S. at 497 (noting value of individual communication). "The suppression of a
particular writing or other tangible form of expression is, therefore, an individual matter, and in the nature of
things every such suppression raises an individual constitutional problem, in which a reviewing court must
determine for itself whether the attacked expression is suppressable within constitutional standards." Id.
(emphasis added).
268. 354 U.S. 436 (1957).
269. See id. at 437, 445 (1957) (noting statute "studiously withholds restraint upon matters not already
published and not yet found to be offensive") (emphasis added).
270. 367 U.S. 717 (1961).
271. Id. at 723-24.
272. See id. (analyzing court difference in opinion years later).
273. See id.
274. 370 U.S. 478 (1962).
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material.275 The General Counsel of the Post Office informed petitioners that
the post office was not mailing the magazines because they were
"nonmailable," and a hearing would not be held due to insignificant monetary
value at stake.276 Ultimately, petitioners had a hearing before a Post Office
Judicial Officer, who affirmed that the magazines were nonmailable.277 In a
concurring opinion, Justice Brennan found that the Post Office administrative
hearing system raised serious concerns about procedural safeguards, including
whether Congress can create regulations that allow speech to be categorized as
obscene without judicial oversight.278  Justice Brennan found that "the
suggestion that Congress may constitutionally authorize any process other than
a fully judicial one immediately raises the gravest doubts" as to whether such a
regime would satisfy the First Amendment.
279
The reason not to trust the government as fact-finders regarding whether
expression is outside the scope of the First Amendment is plain: "[b]ecause the
censor's business is to censor, there inheres the danger that he may well be less
responsive than a court-part of an independent branch of government-to the
constitutionally protected interests in free expression."280 Under Freedman v.
Maryland, prior restraints must satisfy stringent procedural requirements,
geared toward enhancing judicial review and oversight of administrative
censorship schemes:
'[A]ny restraint imposed prior to judicial review must be limited to a specified
brief period;' any further restraint prior to a final judicial determination must be
limited to 'the shortest fixed period compatible with sound judicial resolution;'
and the burden of going to court to suppress speech and the burden of proof in
court must be placed on the government.
281
As Freedman itself recognizes, however, prior restraint doctrine is not
applicable to all situations in which a court seeks to balance First Amendment
rights against some other interest. First, Freedman addresses only the need to
counteract problems with the censorship system.282 ,While various situations
have applied Freedman, courts have not consistently demanded that the
government seek a judicial determination before taking action regarding
275. See id. at 496; see also Monaghan, supra note 262, at 520 (explaining holding of Manual Enters. v.
Day).
276. See Manual Enters., 370 U.S. at 496 (Brennan, J., concurring).
277. See id at 480-81 (majority opinion) (describing nature of magazine at issue).
278. See id at 497-98 (Brennan, J., concurring) (discussing threat toward First Amendment).
279. Id. at 519 (Brennan, J., concurring) (exploring adequacy of procedural safeguards).
280. Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 57-58 (1965).
281. Doe v. Mukasey, 549 F.3d 861, 871 (2d Cir. 2008) (summarizing Freedman v. Maryland
requirements).
282. See Doe v. Gonzales, 500 F. Supp. 2d 379, 381 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (noting Freedman holding).
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283potentially protected speech. Yet, Henry Monaghan summarizes, a "major
teaching of the obscenity cases is that in the [F]irst [A]mendment area judicial
review must either precede final governmental action or expeditiously follow
it.,,284
3. Procedural Due Process
In 1970, Professor Monaghan argued that Freedman compelled an Article III
court to apply extensive procedural measures any time protected speech was at
285risk. But the Supreme Court has never reached this conclusion. In Waters v.
Churchill,286 the plaintiff, a public employee, challenged her termination,
which was based on negative comments he made about her workplace.287 A
288plurality of the Court upheld her termination. The Court explained that it
had never proffered a test for assessing when the First Amendment requires a
procedural safeguard, nor did it plan to do so in Waters.28 9 Rather, in Waters
the Court considered what procedures are required before terminating a public
employee, and embraced a flexible, due-process-like approach to First
290Amendment procedure. Writing for the plurality, Justice O'Connor
explained that a procedure should depend on the context of the question, the
cost of implementing a procedure, and the possible constitutional risks that may
develop or be cured.29 1
The Waters Court's flexible approach to First Amendment procedural
requirements is reminiscent of the balancing test used to resolve procedural due
process disputes.292 Closely resembling the Freedman procedural framework, a
procedural due process framework "imposes constraints on governmental
decisions which deprive individuals of 'liberty' or 'property' interests within
the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth or Fourteenth
Amendment."293  The Mathews v. Eldridge294 test balances three factors to
determine whether an administrative procedure that deprives an individual of a
liberty or property interest satisfies constitutional due process requirements:
283. See id at 401 (illustrating cases applying Freedman).
284. Monaghan, supra note 262, at 532.
285. See id. at 524-25 (extending Freedman procedural safeguards to all forms of protected speech).
286. 511 U.S. 661 (1994).
287. See id. at 667.
288. See id at 681 (agreeing with reversal of summary judgment for petitioner).
289. Seeid at671.
290. See Waters, 511 U.S. at 675 (analyzing public employment decisions in light of First Amendment
considerations).
291. See id
292. See Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 671 (1994) (weighing procedure costs and level of
significance of risks); see also Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 529 (2004) (describing due process inquiry
as "judicious balancing" of private against Government's interests).
293. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332 (1976).
294. 424 U.S. 319, 332 (1976).
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the "private interest" affected; the "risk of an erroneous deprivation" of that
interest and the extent to which "additional or substitute safeguards" could
minimize that risk; and the government's interest in maintaining current
procedures and avoiding "fiscal and administrative burdens" imposed by
additional requirements.295  This balancing test is flexible. The "substitute"
safeguards mentioned in Mathews need not be full-fledged hearings with the
rights to counsel, to present evidence and to confront and cross-examine
296adverse witnesses. 6 A "factfimding process that is both prudent and
incremental" may be sufficient.
297
Public employee termination clearly raises different issues than prior
restraint, and the procedural safeguards necessary in the public employment
context reflect that.298  As such, Waters reflects a commitment, if not to
applying the specific procedural requirements of Freedman, to the application
of the types of general principles of procedural due process articulated in
Mathews.299 Thus, a more deferential procedure is adequate to protect First
Amendment rights in the employment context because the underlying
principles that necessitate safeguards in the first place are materially
different.300  At the same time, the plurality rejected Justice Scalia's proposed
approach that would have limited procedural safeguards where deprivation of
First Amendment rights occurred "through the judicial process."301 Writing for
the plurality, Justice O'Connor noted that "administrative action" can have as
harsh an effect on speech as judicial sanctions, pointing out that in Speiser v.
Randall, the Court had previously struck down administrative procedures that
deprived individuals of First Amendment rights.
302
Of core importance in determining whether procedures are constitutionally
adequate under the Due Process Clause is access to a neutral decision maker.
30 3
295. See id at 335.
296. See id
297. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 539 (2004) (describing "proper heed" courts should pay to
sensitive matters).
298. See Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 672 (1994) (distinguishing between government employment
and sovereign government procedural requirements).
299. See id. at 675. In Waters, Justice O'Connor obliquely referred to the third Mathews factor, the
government interest, by differentiating between the government as employer and the government as sovereign.
See id. A government may dismiss an employee, she argued, not because the dismissal would be narrowly
tailored to achieve a compelling government interest, but because "the government's interest in achieving its
goals as effectively and efficiently as possible is elevated from a relatively subordinate interest when it acts as
sovereign to a significant one when it acts as employer." Id. at 675.
300. See id (differentiating between speech restrain on general public and public employees).
301. Id. at 687 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
302. See Waters, 511 U.S. at 669.
303. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 533 (2004) (citing Concrete Pipe & Prods. of Cal., Inc. v.
Constr. Laborers Pension Trust for S. Cal., 508 U.S. 602, 617 (1993)) (stating "due process requires a 'neutral
and detached judge in the first instance"'); see also Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306,
313 (1950) (requiring that "deprivation of life, liberty or property by adjudication be preceded by notice and
opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case").
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An inkling that a decisionmaker may not "hold the balance nice, clear and true"
undermines trust in the integrity of an adjudicative process.304 As the case law
governing the right to a neutral decision maker makes clear, due process
demands will not tolerate a hearing by a person who has a financial stake in the
outcome of a given case.305 Institutional biases, however, are less problematic.
In Schweiker v. McClure,30 6 the Supreme Court rejected a challenge to the
hearings afforded to Medicare claimants, which hearing officers appointed by
insurance carriers oversaw.307 The Schweiker Court embraced the presumption
that the hearing officers were sufficiently unbiased and placed the burden to
308 309prove otherwise on plaintiffs.3°  Similarly, in Marshall v. Jericco, the Court
rejected a challenge to the Fair Labor and Standards Act procedures for
collecting fines, under which the office that assessed the fines also collected a
share after payment.310 In rejecting the contention that such reimbursement
rendered the assessing officers biased, the Court held that those officers were
more akin to prosecutors than to judges.
311
Beyond the direct role of due process in protecting civil liberties, the due
process approach also plays a structural role in safeguarding the separation of
312powers. According to Michael McConnell and Nathan Chapman, "due
process has from the beginning been bound up with the division of the
authority to deprive subjects of life, liberty, or property between independent
political institutions.' '313  Legislative acts that impinged upon individual
property or liberty rights were always questionable under the Due Process
Clause, because the basis of the due process concept, from the very beginning,
required that individual branches of the government operated "in a distinctive
manner," especially in situations affecting a citizen's liberty or property.
314
The due process framework is useful in understanding the NSL's procedural
flaws because NSLs do not include many of the minimal safeguards anticipated
by Schweiker, Jericco, and Waters. For example, unlike the claimants in
Schweiker and Jericco, an NSL target has no opportunity to confront a decision
maker-whether neutral or biased-regarding NSL issuance or use. While
304. Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 532 (1927) (examining importance of due process in procedural
matters).
305. See id. at 523 (describing judges' "substantial pecuniary interest" in finding against the defendant).
306. 456 U.S. 188 (1982).
307. See id. at 200 (holding current procedures sufficient to protect claimant's interests).
308. See id at 195 (placing officers in quasi-judicial position and requiring proof to warrant
disqualification).
309. 446 U.S. 238 (1980).
310. See id at 251-52 (holding current reimbursement procedure sufficiently fair according to Due
Process Clause).
311. See id. at 248.
312. See Nathan S. Chapman & Michael W. McConnell, Due Process as Separation of Powers, 121 YALE
L.J. 1672, 1729 (2012).
313. Id. at 1681.
314. Seeid at 1781.
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Speiser counsels that administrative First Amendment deprivations are
cognizable harms, in the NSL context, targets lack any administrative or
judicial forum in which to raise those rights. Rather, only NSL recipients may
raise those arguments and then only in secretive, nonpublic judicial
proceedings that rarely occur. In the majority of NSL cases, the Executive
branch operates alone, unchecked by either the Judiciary or individual
claimants.
4. Heightened Scrutiny
A final potential First Amendment safeguard is the application of heightened
scrutiny. Courts consider deprivations of associational rights under a strict
scrutiny framework.31 5  Unlike in the associational rights context, however,
courts tend not to apply heightened scrutiny when considering the
constitutionality of investigative methods under the First Amendment. Under
ECPA's NSL provision, the FBI is required to certify that an investigation is
not based solely on First Amendment activity.316  Although this provision
appears explicit, courts have been far less demanding and typically do not
apply heightened scrutiny to this inquiry.
In Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago,3 17 the Seventh Circuit
refused to enjoin the application of FBI guidelines that allowed investigation on
the basis of statements that "advocate[d] criminal activity or indicate[d] an
apparent intent o engage in crime."318  The Seventh Circuit concluded that
because investigations are less intrusive and "repressive" than prosecutions,
investigations need not be subjected to the same strict standard.319 Likewise, in
litigation challenging surveillance and investigative practices in the New York
City Police Department, the District Court for the Southern District of New
York concluded that he complaint raised a question of whether police practices
"are justified by the legitimate needs of law enforcement.'" 320 Likewise, the
Ninth Circuit has required only that investigations impacting First Amendment
315. See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963) (holding First and Fourteenth Amendments
protected NAACP activities). "The decisions of this Court have consistently held that only a compelling state
interest in the regulation of a subject within the State's constitutional power to regulate can justify limiting First
Amendment freedoms." Id.
316. See Office of Legal Counsel, supra note 24, at 1; see also Ellen S. Podgor, Department of Justice
Guidelines: Balancing "Discretionary Justice," 13 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 167, 172 (2004) (describing
Justice guidelines, including "prior approvals" requirements for certain actions); see also Hannah Bloch-
Wehba, FBI Failed To Follow Its Own Rules When It Impersonated the Associated Press in a 2007
Investigation, REPORTERS COMM. FOR FREEDOM PRESS (Apr. 28, 2016), https://rcfp.org/browse-media-law-
resources/news/fbi-failed-follow-its-own-rules-when-it-impersonated-associated-press (discussing approval
requirements for undercover operations involving "sensitive circumstances").
317. 742 F.2d 1007 (7th Cir. 1984).
318. Id. at 1010.
319. Seeidat1016.




rights serve a "legitimate law enforcement interest.,
32 1
Rightly, the FBI is not required to go before a court whenever it opens an
investigation that may be predicated on First Amendment activity. For
example, if the FBI were to open an investigation based on statements made on
Twitter, it need not first seek a judicial answer to the question of whether the
First Amendment protects or covers the information. Nevertheless, even
legitimate investigative activity can certainly infringe First Amendment
rights.322
Of course, enforcing a statute of general applicability does not invariably
create First Amendment problems.323 For example, the Supreme Court decided
not to apply strict scrutiny to general laws governing investigative activity that
implicated press rights.324  Yet determining that surveillance of
communications does not implicate First Amendment rights because the
surveillance is generalized only creates more questions than it does answers.
Analysis of burdens on speech often rests on a distinction between
"government actions aimed at communicative impact" and actions "aimed at
noncommunicative impact but nonetheless having adverse effects on
communicative opportunity.' 325 While content-based regulations focus on the
impact of the activity, content-neutral laws are not aimed at communicative
impact, but still have an adverse effect on that activity.
326
One way to explain the imbalance between stricter eview for government
regulations that incidentally burden speech and rational basis review for
content-based investigations is that heightened scrutiny applies to incidental
restrictions on speech only when the conduct encompasses a "significant
expressive element" that in fact necessitated the legal action.327  When law
enforcement construes the impetus for an investigation as conduct rather than
speech, the applicable test is whether the investigation is "justified by the
legitimate needs of law enforcement."328  Investigations motivated by an
"unambiguous" intention to violate the First Amendment are subject to strict
321. United States v. Mayer, 503 F.3d 740, 751 (9th Cir. 2007).
322. See 28 C.F.R. § 50.10 (2015) (differentiating extraordinary measures from standard practice). "[U]se
of certain law enforcement tools ... to seek information from, or records of, non-consenting members of the
news media [are] extraordinary measures, not standard investigatory practices." Id.
323. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 682 (1972).
324. Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 670 (1991) (holding reporter who disclosed confidential
source had no special protection from general laws). Specifically, the Supreme Court held that, because the
press has no "special" rights or privileges beyond those of the First Amendment more generally, "enforcement
of such general laws against the press is not subject to stricter scrutiny than would be applied to enforcement
against other persons or organizations." Id.
325. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-2, at 790 (2d ed. 1988).
326. Michael Dorf, Incidental Burdens on Fundamental Rights, 109 HARv. L. REv. 1176, 1201 (1996).
327. Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 478 U.S. 697, 706 (1986); see also Dorf, supra note 326, at 1204-05
(noting limit on application of heightened scrutiny to certain conduct).
328. Handschu v. Special Servs. Div., 349 F. Supp. 766, 771 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); see also United States v.
Mayer, 503 F.3d 740, 751 (9th Cir. 2007).
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scrutiny; in contrast, "investigations motivated by some (perhaps dimly
discernible) law enforcement purpose are in all instances constitutional.,329 By
framing investigations as "motivated" by conduct rather than expression or
other First Amendment activity, law enforcement avoids the heightened
scrutiny that the Constitution requires.
330
Even accepting the doubtful application of the legitimate interest test, the
secrecy surrounding NSLs makes it impossible to tell whether investigations
are properly motivated, or (put another way) whether facially content-neutral
authorities are applied in a content-based manner. For example, penalizing
members of specific political or religious groups, or identifying certain
journalists who publish stories that rely on unauthorized disclosures of
classified information, would appear to be content-based even if the decisions
are properly "motivated.,331 Even assuming NSLs are truly content-neutral, it
is not clear that the legitimate interest test is appropriate if, indeed, the statute
incidentally burdens speech.332
B. Soft Safeguards
NSL authority also lacks key procedural safeguards present in other
information-gathering mechanisms through internal review and judicial
supervision.333 These safeguards are not ordinarily legally binding, and do not
give rise to a private right of action on the part of a target. Yet these safeguards
can help set norms regarding the appropriateness of FBI action.334
1. Chain of Command
One typical soft safeguard requires involving other stakeholders in internal
review processes for legal orders.335 For example, when the FBI seeks a grand
329. Alliance To End Repression v. City of Chicago, 742 F.2d 1007, 1020 (7th Cir. 1984) (Cudahy, J.,
dissenting).
330. See id. at 1024 n.9 (Cudahy, J, dissenting) (explaining First Amendment "does not limit"
investigations if"properly motivated").
331. See Eugene Volokh, Laws of General Applicability, Content-Based as Applied and Content-Neutral
as Applied, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (July 3, 2007), www.volokh.com/posts/1 83481341.shtml [http://perma.cc/
DK2-YHTH].
332. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968). O'Brien holds that a regulation incidentally
burdening First Amendment rights is "sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional power of the
Government; if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is
unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment
freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest." Id.
333. See infra note 346 and accompanying text (illustrating one example of soft-procedural safeguards).
334. Cf Gersen & Posner, supra note 228, at 575 ("Soft law in international relations, like small-c
constitutional law, consists of norms that affect he behavior of agents, even though the norms do not have the
status of formal law.").
335. See FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, DOMESTIC INVESTIGATIONS AND OPERATIONS GUIDE § 18.5.9
(2011) (listing process required for FBI to request grand jury subpoena). In fact, subpoenas or court orders for
records of the news media may be issued only "after negotiations with the affected member of the news media
2016]
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jury subpoena, the FBI must request the subpoena through a United States
Attorney.336 When the FBI seeks a § 215 order, the process usually is broken
into five parts: "FBI field office initiation and review, FBI Headquarters
review, OIPR [Office of Intelligence Policy and Review] review, FISA Court
review, and FBI service of the order.,337 By contrast, the NSL statute requires
no such internal review. In part because of this divergence, the President's
Review Group on Intelligence and Communications Technologies
recommended in 2013 that NSLs be issued with judicial approval, noting that
the "more demanding" requirements for § 215 orders would tend to drive
agents to use the less onerous NSL process to seek the same records.
338
The FBI's internal review procedures for NSLs do mirror the procedures for
issuing administrative subpoenas under the Controlled Substances Act.3 39 In
the context of the Controlled Substances Act, the Attorney General delegated
her authority to issue subpoenas to a select group of DEA and FBI officials.34°
The Controlled Substances Act, however, unlike ECPA, does not include any
authority for a nondisclosure order barring the recipient from discussing a
subpoena.341  In the only case involving a nondisclosure requirement in
connection with a subpoena under the Controlled Substances Act, he recipient




A more robust application of internal safeguards offers another path forward.
The FBI and DOJ guidelines, as well as § 215 and the NSL statutes, already bar
investigation based solely on First Amendment activity. Nevertheless, federal
case law appears to permit these forbidden investigations whenever there is a
legitimate law enforcement need. As a result of this precedent, the existing
First Amendment protections are weaker than the text suggests. Stronger
internal guidelines geared toward helping law enforcement officers evaluate
have been pursued and appropriate notice to the affected member of the news media has been provided," unless
the Attorney General determines that negotiations or notice would risk an enumerated harm. See Gersen &
Posner, supra note 228.
336. See id.
337. 215 REPORT, supra note 208, at 10.
338. See PRESIDENT'S REVIEW GRP. ON INTELLIGENCE AND COMMC'NS TECHNOLOGIES, LIBERTY AND
SECURITY IN A CHANGING WORLD 93 n.83 (2013).
339. See 21 U.S.C. § 876 (2012) (comparing process of service).
340. See 28 C.F.R. Pt. 0, subpart R, app., § 4(a) (2010) (delegating subpoena authority). The "FBI
Assistant Special Agents-in-Charge; ... FBI Supervisory Senior Resident Agents; ... [and] those FBI Special
Agent Squad Supervisors who have management responsibility over Organized Crime/Drug Program
Investigations" are authorized to sign and issue subpoenas. See id
341. See id. (failing to mention nondisclosure power).
342. See United States v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 516 F. Supp. 225, 233 (D. Wyo. 1981)
(determining disclosing subpoena would be detrimental to investigation).
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First Amendment harms may help address this problem.
Recent changes to the DOJ's internal guidelines for subpoenas and warrants
targeting the news media offer some guidance.343 In the wake of the subpoena
targeting the Associated Press' phone lines and the warrant targeting James
Rosen's personal Gmail account, the DOJ revised its guidelines for the use of
warrants and subpoenas to obtain records of, or information from, members of
the news media.344 The guidelines emphasize the need to "strike the proper
balance" of interests including national security, law enforcement needs, and
the independent role of the free press.
345
The guidelines make clear that the use of subpoenas or search warrants to
gather information or records from a member of the news media is an
extraordinary event and not customary.346 As a result, investigators may use
search warrants and subpoenas to obtain information from the news media only
after "reasonable" alternatives have been exhausted, and the member of the
news media is notified and has an opportunity to negotiate.3 47  Only the
Attorney General may waive these requirements if he or she decides that, for
"compelling reasons," negotiations would "would pose a clear and substantial
threat to the integrity of the investigation, risk grave harm to national security,
or present an imminent risk of death or serious bodily harm."
348
Nonetheless, the guidelines have very serious shortcomings. First, as DOJ
guidelines, they do not constrain any of the intelligence agencies except for the
FBI.3 49 The DOJ guidelines also do not apply to any of the national security
information-gathering statutes, including NSLs, which closely resemble
subpoenas. 350  The guidelines require investigators to use any reasonable,
different avenues to obtain information from other sources.351 To a skeptical
reader, this appears to be a virtual invitation to obtain information from
national security surveillance in leaks investigations.
Despite these limitations, the guidelines do offer structural guidance for
effective internal safeguards. First, they offer a presumption that when
information-gathering tools target records of or information from reporters and
journalists, those targets are entitled to notice and an opportunity to negotiate in
all but the most exceptional cases.352 Second, they offer workable boundaries
343. See 28 C.F.R. § 50.10 (2015) (detailing policy to obtain information from news media sources).
344. See id.; see also Ann E. Marimow, Justice Department's Scrutiny of Fox News Reporter James Rosen
in Leak Case Draws Fire, WASH. POST (May 20, 2013), http://wapo.st/18ZTg9P [http://perma.cc/489N-
MX8H] (reporting widespread outrage due to investigation of news reporter).
345. See 28 C.F.R. § 50.10(a)(2) (2015).
346. See id.
347. See id. § (a)(3).
348. See id. (describing when Attorney General may waive notification requirements).






for determining whether the enhanced protections apply: the guidelines are in
place to protect "newsgathering activities," not individual journalists and
reporters.353 Third, they realistically account for emergencies and exceptional
situations that do not permit for notice and negotiation before information is
sought.354 These characteristics make the guidelines a useful model for other
agencies to follow in developing and implementing internal procedures that
would effectively safeguard press rights.
V. CONCLUSION
Procedural safeguards for First Amendment rights are not absolute. Their
presence depends on the application of the flexible framework from both
Mathews and Waters, and their content can take many different shapes: soft
and hard, secret and public. But NSLs, which lack any familiar form of
safeguard for the First Amendment rights of subscribers, exemplify the risks of
a flexible approach without clear procedural requirements. Without a rule to
guide agencies or courts, it is unclear which, if any, particular procedures might
be required for issuing legal process that targets activity protected by the First
Amendment. It is equally evident that taken together, a system in which the
FBI can-without judicial oversight-simultaneously issue both a subpoena for
communications records and a nondisclosure order gagging the recipient lacks
adequate procedural safeguards to protect expressive, associational, religious,
and press rights. Efforts to reform NSL process should focus on bringing the
tool into procedural conformity with other, analogous processes within the
national security space to ensure that First Amendment rights consistently
receive appropriate protections.
353. See28 C.F.R. § 50.10(a)(3) (2015).
354. See id.
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